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: ACTS & EVIDENCES OF THE ACTS 
AGGRESSION AND ANNEXATION 
OF VIETNAM AGAINST KAMPUCHEA 



— ■ 



IE LACK 
PAPER 

FACTS AND EVIDENCES 
OF THE ACTS OF AGGRESSION AND ANNEXATION 
OF VIETNAM AGAINST KAMPUCHEA 



Department of Press and Information of the 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 

Democratic Kampuchea 

September 1978 






Reprinted by Group of Kampuchean Residents in America (G.K.RAM). For 
additional copies of this book and for more information on Democratic Kam- 
puchea, please write to: 

G.K.RAM 
P.O. Box 5857 
Grand Central Station 
New York, NY 10017 



D5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS V5 

I97&X 

Chapter 1 — The Annexationist Nature of Vietnam 3 

1 . The acts of Aggression, Expansion and Annexation of 

Vietnam in the Past 3 

a. Champa 3 

b . Kampuchea Krom 4 

2. The Manoeuvres and Methods Used by the Vietnamese to Annex 

and Swallow Kampuchea's Territory in the Past 6 

a. The sordid use of Vietnamese girls 6 

b. The Vietnamese processes of encroachment on the 

territory along the borders 6 

c. The use of the banner of revolution to take 

possession of territories 8 

3. The Factors Which Have Induced the Vietnamese to Carry Out 

A Policy of Expansion and Annexation 9 

a. Economic factor 9 

b. Political factor 10 

c. Military factor 1 1 

Chapter 2 — The Strategy of "Indochina Federation" of the Indochinese 

Communist Party of Ho Chi Minh 14 

1. The Indochinese Communist Party and its Political Programme .... 14 

2. The Carrying Out of the Vietnamese Strategy of "Indochina 
Federation" in Kampuchea and the Concrete Situation 

From 1930 to 1970 15 

a. The period of 1930 to 1945 15 

b. The period of 1945 to 1954 15 

c. The period of 1954 to 1970 17 

Chapter 3 — The Struggle Between Kampuchea and Vietnam on 

the Issue of the Political Line from 1954 to 1970 23 

1. Period from 1954 to 1960 23 

2. Period from 1961 to 1970 25 

3. About the People Trained and Organized by the Vietnamese 28 

Chapter 4 — The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent 
Political Line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
From 1970 to 1975 31 

1 . The Situation of Kampuchea Before the Coup d'etat: Vietnam 
Violently Opposed the Political Line of the Communist 

Party of Kampuchea 31 

2. The March 18, 1970's Coup d'Etat: Vietnam Praises the Political 
Line of the Commenist Party of Kampuchea and Implores Aid 

and Assistance of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 34 

3. The Vietnamese Manoeuvres Towards the Delegation of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea On Its Passing Through In 

The Vietnamese Territory 51 

1676417 



4. The Vietnamese Manoeuvres in Kampuchea Aiming at Taking 

Over the State Power 54 

a. The Vietnamese wanted to set up mixed commands 

and mixed organs of power , 54 

b. The Vietnamese secretly organized a parallel State power 

in Kampuchea 56 

c. The Vietnamese secretly organized a parallel army in Kampuchea . 56 

d. The Vietnamese secretly organized military training and 

medical training schools in Kampuchea 57 

5. The Vietnamese Wanted to Annihilate the Leadership of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea in November 1970 57 

6. The Criminal and Fascist Acts of the Vietnamese Against 
Kampuchea's People 60 

7. The Vietnamese Plan to Overthrow the Revolutionary Power 

of Kampuchea and To Set Up a New Communist Party . 62 

a. In 1973 62 

b. In 1975 63 

8. The Ungrateful Nature of the Vietnamese Towards the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea Which had Rescued Them 

From the Total Collapse from 1970 to 1975 64 

Chapter 5 - The Paris Negotiations and the Vietnamese Attempts 

at Destroying Kampuchea's Revolution 66 

1 . The Contents of the Talks Between the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea and the Vietnamese in 1970 - 1971 66 

2. The Paris Negotiations Between the Vietnamese and the U.S. and 
the Vietnamese Manoeuvres Aiming at Destroying Kampuchea's 
Revolution 67 

a. The situation in mid- 1972 67 

b. The Vietnamese threats and pressures forcing the Communist 

Party of Kampuchea to negotiate 68 

c. The position of the Communist Party of Kampuchea on the 
problem of negotiations and cease-fire 70 

Chapter 6 - The Activities of Vietnam for Achieving its Objective 
Aiming at Annexing and Swallowing Kampuchea 
From 1975 Up to Now 73 

1. From April 17, 1975 to the First Semester of 1977 73 

2. From Mid-1977 to Mid-1978 77 

3. The Coup d'Etat Attempt Staged by Vietnam in May 1978 79 

4. The Defeats of the Vietnamese Strategy "Lightning Attack, 

Lightning Victory" 82 

Chapter 7 - By Way of Conclusion 85 



INTRODUCTION 






"Democratic Kampuchea, full of goodwill, is firmly determined to 
maintain close and friendly relations with all countries having com- 
mon borders with her, and with all countries, near or far, through- 
out the world on the strict basis of mutual respect for sovereignty 
and territorial integrity." (Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, 
Chapter XVI, Article 21.) 

That is the sincere aspiration of the Kampuchea's people and the 
basis of the foreign policy of Democratic Kampuchea. But Vietnam 1 , 
which has always had the ambition to annex and swallow Kam- 
puchea, and to exterminate the nation of Kampuchea through its 
sinister strategy of 'Indochina Federation", has carried out the most 
perfidious activities for many decades aiming at achieving its ob- 
jective : 

• 1930 - 1945: The Vietnamese 1 proceeded through the Indochi- 
nese Communist Party of Ho Chi Minh. 

• 1945 - 1954: The Vietnamese carried out their activities under 
the banner of the struggle against French colonialism. 

• 1954 - 1970: Under the Geneva Agreements (July 20, 1954) the 
Vietnamese were forced to withdraw from Kampuchea and return 
to their country. But they never forgot their strategy of "Indochina 
Federation". They constantly opposed the political line of the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea since its founding in 1960, and they 
carried out successive undermining activities to destroy Kampuchea's 
revolution. They intensified these criminal activities since 1965, the 
date on which they asked for and obtained the authorization to 
come and take refuge in Kampuchea while being chased by the US 
imperialists and the Saigon's clique, when they had no more terri- 



1 



Introduction 

tories in South Vietnam to install themselves. 

• 1970 - 1975: The Kampuchea's revolution rescued the Vietna- 
mese from defeat. But being still more ungrateful than crocodiles, 
the Vietnamese continued to more feverishly carry out their activi- 
ties of sabotage against the Kampuchea's revolution aiming at swal- 
lowing Kampuchea. 

• 1975 - 1978: The Vietnamese, in collusion with the US imperial- 
ists, carried out subversive activities and attempts at coups d'etat to 
overthrow Democratic Dampuchea. As their criminal activities al- 
ways failed, they mobilized 14 divisions at the end of 1977 to in- 
vade and aggress Democratic Kampuchea in order to take possession 
of her at one go, following their strategy of "Lightning attack, light- 
ning victory". 

Vietnam has thus for a very long time carried out its plan of an- 
nexing and swallowing Kampuchea. For nearly 20 years, the Kam- 
puchea's people under the correct and clear-sighted leadership of 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Comrade Secretary Pol 
Pot, smashed all subversive and undermining acts, all attempts at 
coups d'etat and all acts of military invasion and aggression of the 
Vietnamese. 

The Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea waited until December 31, 1977 to inform 
the world of the truth about the criminal acts of Vietnam against 
Kampuchea. They did not do so before this date, for they wanted 
to safeguard friendship with Vietnam. Based on this wise and 
mature position, they have always endeavoured to peacefully solve 
the problem. From 1970 to 1976, Kampuchea entered into about a 
hundred of negotiations with Vietnam at the level of the Central 
Committee of both Parties, about fifty of them have been led by 
Comrade Secretary Pol Pot. Apart from these high level negotiates, 
there were innumerable negotiations at the level of zones, regions 
and districts. But all these negotiations failed, for Vietnam has never 
abandoned its nature of aggressor, annexationist and swallower of 
territories. 

This Black Paper is not the result of any research or a thesis, but 
a document gathering together all the actual facts and events during 
the successive struggles. 



1. THE ANNEXATIONIST 
NATURE OF VIETNAM 



1. In the following pages the words "Vietnam", and "Vietnamese" indicate in- 
differently the Communist Party, of Vietnam (at that time the Workers' Party 
of Vietnam), the Government of Honoi or the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government 'of South Vietnam, the "Vietminh", the "Vietcongs". The clique 
of Ngo Dinh Diem or Thieu-Ky or others are nothing but lackeys of the US 
imperialists. 



1. The Acts of Agression, Expansion and Annexation 
of Vietnam in the Past 

The acts of aggression and annexation of territory perpetrated by 
the Vietnamese in the past as well as at present, have clearly shown 
the true nature of the Vietnamese and Vietnam, that is a nature of 
aggressor, annexationist and swallower of other countries' territories. 
The annexations of Champa and Kampuchea Krom by the Vietna- 
mese have demonstrated it. 

a. Champa 

Champa was founded in the second century, at the epoch of 
Nokor Phnom in Kampuchea. Its territory covered the Central part 
of the present Vietnam. Its people were called Cham. Champa had 
an old and brilliant civilization in Southeast Asia, as demonstrated 
by the My Son monuments. The Vietnamese had unceasingly perpe- 
trated acts of aggression and annexation against Champa. 

• In 1471, the Vietnamese took over the capital of Champa, 
Vijaya, and called it Binh Dinh. From this date, Champa began to 
decline and progressively disappeared as a nation. The Vietnamese 
afterwards "swallowed" the whole territory of Champa and absorbed 
the Cham people who lived in the South of the capital Vijaya. 

• In 1611, the Vietnamese annexed the region of Phu Yen in the 
South of Qui Nhon. 

• In 1653, they annexed the region of Khanh Hoa, (Kantara in 
Cham language), near Nha Trang and Phan Rang (Panduranga in 
Cham language). 

• In 1693, the Vietnamese "swallowed" the whole Champa by 
annexing the region of Phan Thiet. 

The cham race was totally exterminated by the Vietnamese. In a 



The Annexationist Nature of Vietnam 

parallel direction with their conquest of Champa, the Vietnamese 
also enforced their colonial yoke over laos. 

After the take over of Champa, the Vietnamese went on stepping 
up their expansion in the direction of Kampuchea Krom (Southern 
Kampuchea in Khmer language). 

b. Kampuchea Krom 

It is the part of territory of the present South Vietnam including 
the western region of Donai's river and the Mekong's delta. France 
called it "Cocninchine" 1 . This territory had been an integral part 
of Kampuchea for more than 2,000 years. The Vietnamese began to 
encroach on this territory at the beginning of the 17th century. 

In 1623, they obtained the authorization to come and trade at 
Prey Nokor, which they afterwards named Saigon. They took this 
occasion to send several tens of thousands of their people to live 
there. 

The Vietnamese requested the authorization to carry on business 
in Prey Nokor (Saigon) 2 only for five years. But at the end of that 
period, they refused to leave. In 1645, Kampuchea claimed the resti- 
tution of Prey Nokor (Saigon), but the Vietnamese refused. In 1653, 
Kampuchea demanded once again the return of Prey Nokor (Saigon) 
to the motherland. The Vietnamese promised to do so. But these 
were only fallacious promises for in fact, they further settled several 
tens of thousands of their compatriots in Prey Nokor. Using this 
place as a spring-board, the Vietnamese have carried on their expan- 
sion and annexation. 

The below-mentioned dates, given by way of guidance, show the 
penetration of the Vietnamese into Kampuchea's territory. But 
they do not mean that the Vietnamese took possession of these 
territories at these dates, for the whole nation and people of Kam- 
puchea have always fought against the Vietnamese invasion and an- 
nexation. 

• In 1699, the Vietnamese occupied the provinces of Ba Ria 
(Phuoc Le), Kampong Sraka Trei (Bien Hoa) and Prey Nokor 
(Saigon). 

• In 1715, without the knowledge of the Khmer authorities, the 
Vietnamese through their adverturers practically controlled the pro- 
vinces of Peam Banteay Meas (Ha Tien) and Kramuon Sar (Rach 
Gia). 

• In 1732, the Vietnamese occupied the provinces of Peam Me 
Sar (My Tho) and Long Hor (Vinh Long). 



1 . about the meaning of the name, see page 5. 

2. The names in parentheses are those given by the Vietnamese to the Khmer 
cities and provinces after having annexed them. 



The Annexationist Nature of Vietnam 

• in 1757, the Vietnamese tried to implant the border at Moat 
Chrouk (Chau Doc). 

• In 1758, the Vietnamese took possession of Preah Trapeang 
province (Tra Vinh) and Khleang province (Soc Trang). 

The Kampuchea's people have waged an unceasing struggle 
against the Vietnamese penetration in order to recover the territories 
belonging to them. Let us quote the main events: 

• In 1731, the people of Ba Phnom province (Eastern Kampuchea) 
rose up to drive out the Vietnamese. 

• In 1 738, the Kampuchea's army expelled all the Vietnamese out 
of Peam Banteay Meas (Ha Tien). 

• In 1743, the people of Khleang province (Soc Trang) revolted 
and expelled all the Vietnamese. In 1748, they prevented the Viet- 
namese from coming back. The Kampuchea's army crushed the 
Vietnamese army at Sap Angkam, Pursat province. 

• In 1776, the people of Peam Me Sar (My Tho) and Long Hor 
(Vinh Long) provinces revolted and the Kampuchea's army liberat- 
ed the two provinces. 

• In 1835-47, the people of Preah Trapeang (Tra Vinh) province 
rose up against the Vietnamese. In 1845, the whole Kampuchea's 
people rose up to crush the Vietnamese. 

• In 1858, the people of Moat Chrouk province (Chau Doc) liber- 
ated their territory and rejoined it to Kampuchea again. Kam- 
puchea's army drove the Vietnamese out of the provinces of Khleang 
(Soc Trang), Preah Trapeang (Tra Vinh) and Kramuon Sar (Rach Gia). 

Under the French colonial rule (1863-1954), the Vietnamese took 
possession of other Kampuchea's territories. They were in collusion 
with the French colonialists who had taken possession of the region 
of Prey Nokor (Saigon) in 1859. During this colonial period Kam- 
puchea lost the following territories: 

• In 1870-1873: Raung Damrei (Tay Ninh) province, the region 
located along the two Vaico rivers, the territories of Peam Banteay 
Meas (Ha Tien), Moat Chrouk (Chau Doc) and Prasat Dap (Dong 
Thap). 

• 1890-1914: Choeung Preah province (Song Be). 

• 1929. the French colonialists annexed the region of Darlac 
(Dae Lac) and gave it to the Vietnamese. 

• In 1939: the french colonialists administratively attached the 
islands of Koh Tral (Phu Quoc) and Koh Russei (Hon Doc) and a 
number of other islands to Cochinchina, and consequently to Viet- 
nam. 

Up to the second World War, the Vietnamese annexed 65,000 
square kilometres of Kampuchea Krom's territory, absorbed more 
than one million of Kampuchea's people (the present number of 
the Kampuchea Krom's people called "Khmers Krom" is nearly 
4 million). 



The Annexationist Nature of Vietnam 

These are the acts of aggression and annexation perpetrated by 
the Vietnamese in the past. At present, the Vietnamese continue to 
act in the same manner. Like a python, they are progressively swal- 
lowing some country, both territory and population. But at the 
same time, they launch large-scale attacks of aggression against 
Kampuchea aiming at "swallowing" her. 

So, whether in the feudalist era, in the French colonialists' peri- 
od, in the U.S. imperialists' period or in the Ho Chi Minh's period 
(that is the present period), the Vietnamese have not changed their 
true nature, that is the nature of the aggressor, annexationist and 
swallower of other countries' territories. 

2. The Manoeuvres and Methods Used by the Vietnamese 

To Annex and Swallow the Kampuchea's Territory in the Past 

a. The sordid use of Vietnamese girls 

The French called Kampuchea Krom "Cochinchine". This name 
is made up of the Vietnamese words Co-Chin-Xin. "Co" means 
"Miss", "Chin" is the name of a girl, and "Xin" means "ask for". 
Thus, "Co-Chin-Xin" means "Miss Chin asks for". History has re- 
vealed that in the 17th century, the king of Annam at the court of 
Hue married his daughter to the Khmer king Chey Chetha II (1618- 
1628). In return, in 1623, the king of Annam asked for the authori- 
zation to open trade counters and to administrate the custom-service 
in the region of Prey Nokor (Saigon). At the intervention of his 
Annamese wife, Chey Chetha II agreed. Tens of thousands of Viet- 
namese nationals then came and settled themselves in that region, 
and took possession of the territories of the region of Prey Nokor 
(Saigon), Ba Ria (Phuoc Le) and Kampong Sraka Trey (Bien Hoa). 
They expelled the Khmer people living there and forced them to 
move to the more remote regions. In 1699, the Vietnamese army 
took possession of these three provinces. 

The Vietnamese have often resorted to these sordid methods con- 
sisting of selling their girls in order to achieve their annexationist 
ambitions. Today they still do not hesitate to carry out the same 
repugnant methods to swallow the other country's territories. 

b. The Vietnamese processes of encroachment on 
the territory along the borders 

As we have already seen, the Vietnamese, in collusion with the 
French colonialists, have annexed a lot of Kampuchea's territories. 
Among others, they have taken possession of the provinces of Raung 
Damrei (Tay Ninh) and ChoeungPreah (Song Be). They have nibbled 
at Kampuchea's territory in this region so much that nowadays it 
has the form of a "Parrot Beak". In these provinces, hundreds of 
thousands of people of Khmer nationality are still living. They are 



The Annexationist Nature of Vietnam 

Khmers of origin, like those living in the North of Siemreap In 
Choeung Preah Province (Song Be), there are still many Khmer vil- 
lages the names of which are preceded by the word "Srok" or "Soc" 
"Srok" means village. For example, Srok Svay, Srok Daung, Srok 
Roung, etc. In Raung Damrei province (Tay Ninh) and along the 
Vaico rivers, there are also a lot of Khmer villages the names of 
which cannot be written correctly by the Vietnamese because of 
their pronunciation. For example the word "Thnot" in Khmer has 
become "Ta Not" in Vietnamese; "Dang Tung" has become "Long 
Tung", "Ktum". "Ka Turn", "Kampong Rokar": "Lago" "Kam- 
pong Kdei": "Samyoeur", etc. 

The processes used by the Vietnamese consisted of nibbling at 
the territories, encroaching upon the borders and merely and simply 
establishing geographical maps by themselves. Indeed, all the agents 
of the cadastral department were Vietnamese. The French only had 
to sign. 

In 1966, the authorities of Hanoi and the Vietcongs set up a plan 
to send more Vietnamese nationals into Kampuchea and to increase 
their number from 600,000 to one million. In 1967, they planned 
to send in 200,000 more Vietnamese nationals. At that time, the 
strategic hamlets of the Thieu-Ky's clique were set up all over South 
Vietnam. The man who was in charge of carrying out this plan is 
called Hay So 1 . The Vietnamese authorities sent their nationals to 
live along the banks of the Mekong and Bassac rivers. The Vietna- 
mese nationals went by boats up to Kampong Chhnang and Pursat 
and reached as far as the Great Lakes of Tonle Sap. The province 
of Pursat was chosen as a main base of their settlement. Before the 
1970's coup d'etat, in Peam Chor district (Prey Veng province, East 
zone), 90 per cent of the population were Vietnamese. In 1971, 
their numbers increased to 99 per cent. Along the Mekong and 
Bassac rivers, in Saang and Koh Thorn districts, the Vietnamese 
were first living in their boats. Later on, some settled down on the 
river banks, some continued to live in their boats while the others 
were unceasingly arriving from South Vietnam. Once they had set- 
tled themselves on the river banks, they carried out at the same 
time fishing and retail dealing and drove the Khmer people away 
towards the countryside. 

If measures had not been taken, they would have totally annexed 
the districts of Saang and Koh Thorn. 

It was the same in Takeo province. The districts of Angkor Borei 
and Koh Andet were crowded with Veitnamese. In Kampot pro- 
vince, they were nibbling at lands in the districts of Kampong Trach, 

1 . Member of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese party involved in the 
plot of coup d'etat in the East zone of Kampuchea at the end of May 1978 (see 
Chapter 6,3, page 79.) 



7 



The Annexationist Nature of Vietnam 

Ton Hon and Tuk Meas. The laws and regulations of Kampuchea, 
under the former administration as well as under the present one, 
have never authorized any foreigner to own lands. But the Vietna- 
mese have been very impudent. In the old society they sent in their 
men to get Kampuchea's lands through corruption especially in the 
border areas. They could then nibble more territories. 

c. The use of the banner of revolution 
to take possession of territories 

From 1946 to 1954, under the cover of "revolutionary solidarity" 
against French colonialism, the Vietnamese attempted to take pos- 
session of Kampuchea's territory. Under the banner of revolution, 
the Vietnamese came into Kampuchea and set up cells of the Indo- 
chinese Communist Party in order to grasp Kampuchea's people. 
They organized a party, an army and a State power. They used this 
expedient in order to try to take possession of Kampuchea. 

The Vietnamese methods were more oppressive than those of the 
French colonialists. During their domination over Kampuchea from 
1863 to 1954, the French nationals living in Kampuchea were no 
more than 10,000. To ensure their domination, they had a "Resi- 
dent superieur" in Phnom Penh, "Residents" in the provinces and 
chiefs of departments. Besides, there were no effective soldiers who 
formed the "colonial infantry" and only some French nationals in 
the "native guards". In the rubber plantations, there were only 
about ten French nationals. The French ruled the country through 
the "natives" intermediaries. 

But from 1946 to 1954, the Vietnamese occupied all the offices, 
from chief of village and chief of commune up. They directly con- 
trolled the economy of the villages and communes. They created 
a committee for leading the committee of the puppet party they 
had set up in Kampuchea. The Vietnamese were 50,000 to 100,000 
in Kampuchea 1 . But they did not yet have a big force. And since 
they came in to take possession of Kampuchea's territory, they did 
not enjoy the people's support. 

At that time, the Khmers who waged the struggle in Kampuchea 
did not yet have an independent position. They were totally reliant 
on the Vietnamese. They did not well understand for whom and for 
what purpose they were making revolution. That is why the Vietna- 
mese could easily enter Kampuchea. They divided Kampuchea into 
zones: East zone, Southwest zone and Northwest zone. They could 
install there whoever they wanted. They did everything at the place 
and acted at their will. 

Thus, whether in the period of the feudalists, the time when they 
were colonized, or at present, the Vietnamese have always sought 

1 . The Vietnamese residents in Kampuchea are not included. 
8 






The Annexationist Nature of Vietnam 

by all means to take possession of Kampuchea's territory. 

Kampuchea's people, being victims of the acts of agression and 
annexation of the Vietnamese and having successively lost an im- 
portant part of their Kampuchea Krom's territory, foster a deep 
national hatred against the Vietnamese aggressors, annexationists 
and swallowers of Kampuchea's territory. Kampuchea's people are 
perfectly aware of the Vietnamese treacherous acts, subterfuges 
and hypocrisy. They have always seethed with a deep rancour. 

In order to maintain their vigilance, Kampuchea's people have 
kept alive two phrases in their mind. The first one says: "Be care- 
ful not to spill the master's tea!". It recalls the barbarous crime com- 
mitted by the "Yuons" 1 in 1813 during the digging of Vinh Te 
canal. The Yuons burried alive the Khmer people up to their necks 
and used the latter's heads as a stand for a wood stove to boil water 
for their master's tea. As they burned and suffered, the victims 
shook their heads. At that moment, the Yuon torturers said to 
them: "Be careful not to spill the master's tea!". 

The second phrase is the nickname "Coconut floss" given to the 
Yuons. It recalls the trick used by a Yuon who, chased by Kampu- 
chea's people who were angry with his barbarous crimes, threw him- 
self into the water and tried to escape by hiding his face out of 
water under a coconut floss. But he was discovered by the people. 
This phrase upholds the vigilance of Kampuchea's people against 
the dupery and treacherous acts of the Yuons. 

All these bitter and painful experiences acquired by Kampuchea's 
people have taught them to clearly discern the insatiable expansion- 
ist and annexationist ambition of the Vietnamese as well as their 
political, military, diplomatic and seduction manoeuvres. 

3. The Factors Which Have Induced the Vietnamese 
To Carry Out A Policy of Expansion and Annexation 

a. Economic factor 

Economically, Vietnam is a poor country. Annam, that is Cen- 
tral Vietnam, occupies an area of about 148,000 square kilometres 
but it has only small sandy plains along the seacosts. Away from the 
sea, there are only rocks and then the mountains along the border 
with Laos. Thus, this region is very poor. During the colonization 
period, the French could buy one whole family for only 20 to 30 
piastres and brought them by train into the rubber plantations in 
Cochmchina or Kampuchea. This example underlines the great 
poverty of this region of Vietnam. 






1 . Yuon is the name given by Kampuchea's people to the Vietnamese since the 
epoch of Angkor and it means "savage". The word "Vietnam" and "Vietna- 
mese" are very recent and not often used by Kampuchea's people. 



The Annexationist Nature of Vietnam 

Tonkin or North Vietnam has an area of more than 100,000 
square kilometres. It is also very poor. There are some plains along 
the Red River and in its delta, but the area is small in comparison 
with the population. Besides, North Vietnam has to face natural 
calamities such as floods, droughts and typhoons. The soil is not 
fertile either. It needs a great quantity of fertilizers. The Ho Chi 
Minh regime has not been able to solve the disasters caused by 
floods. And 1 5 years after the departure of the French, only one or 
two provinces can achieve an annual paddy yield of seven tons per 
hectare. As for draught-animals, on average, there is only one ox 
or one buffalo for 4 families. 

For this reason, the Vietnamese seek to take possession of other 
countries' territories. To the North they have to face a country 
stronger than them. To the West, they meet with mountains. There- 
fore, they headed Southward. After having "swallowed" Champa, 
they reached Kampuchea Krom. After "swallowing" Kampuchea 
Krom, they headed for the Northwest, that is towards Kampuchea, 
in the provinces of Kratie, Kampong Cham, Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, 
Kandal, Takeo and Kampot up to Kampong Chhnang, Pursat and 
the Great Lakes of Tonle Sap. 

b. Political factor 

This factor has existed in the Vietnamese history since the feudal- 
ist epoch, but it has become more important today. As they had 
made the revolution, the Vietnamese enjoyed some prestige in 
Southeast Asia. At that time, the international community gave 
them aids and supports. Europe supported them. China helped and 
supported them. The Vietnamese have taken advantage of this sup- 
port and used it as political support in order to carry out their 
scheme of expansion and annexation. They wanted to make them- 
selves the "Father" if not the "Big brother" of "Indochina". At 
home, the Vietnamese forced everybody, at all ages, to call Ho Chi 
Minh, "Uncle Ho". In Kampuchea they initiated the people into 
also calling him "Uncle Ho". In 1965, the leaders of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea called Ho Chi Minh "Comrade Chairman Ho 
Chi Minh". Ho Chi Minh himself, and his circle, turned crimson with 
rage. The Vietnamese wanted everybody to call him "Uncle Ho", 
for this appellation has a meaning close to their ambition of being 
"Father" of "Indochina". On the other hand, the Vietnamese were 
enraged by calling Ho Chi Minh "Comrade Chairman Ho Chi Minh", 
the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea showed the na- 
tional position of independence and sovereignty of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea in the relations between parties. 

This little fact underlines that at the Ho Chi Minh epoch, the 
Vietnamese ambition aiming at dominating Kampuchea was still 
more obstinate than that at the feudalist epoch. The Vietnamese 

10 






The Annexationist Nature of Vietnam 

want to take possession of Kampuchea in order to use her as a 
spring-board for their expansion in Southeast Asia. They have de- 
clared that after they have liberated Kampuchea and Laos, they 
would also liberate Southeast Asia. This devouring ambition has 
been inculcated to all the Vietnamese, whether they are ranking 
officers, soldiers or citizens, so that they speak the same language, 
in the most ordinary way. The Vietnamese seek progressively to 
satisfy their ambition, for they have their nationals at one and the 
same time in Kampuchea, Lao and Thailand. They want to swallow 
Laos and Kampuchea in order to become a big power and then ex- 
tend their influence over Southeast Asia. They try to create favour- 
able conditions in order to dominate these countries through the 
parties they have created and through the control they have exerted 
on the armed forces. 

c. Military factor 

This factor proceeds from the economic and political factors. 
The Vietnamese want to have a powerful military base in "Indo- 
china" which they could rely on to achieve their ambition in South- 
east Asia. They have progressively organized and built up their 
forces and military bases in order to satisfy their economic and 
political ambitions. One might allege that the Vietnamese have no 
possibility of building up military bases, for they are not as rich as 
the US imperialists. The past experiences have shown that the Viet- 
namese, while directly penetrating in the concerned countries, have 
carried out their political and spying activities and founded their 
own armies in these countries. In Kampuchea for instance, between 
1946 and 1954, they had several times created seperately an army 
composed of Khmers in their pay in order to use them as a tool of 
their policy of annexation. And when they came back to Kampuchea 
in 1964, they resumed their activities in the same objective. They 
have proceeded like that not only in Kampuchea, but also in other 
countries where they have their nationals and where they could 
draw the sympathy of the local people. Their objective is to create 
an armed organization devoted to them. With such an armed organi- 
zation in these countries, they can progressively develop their activi- 
ties and then introduce their own forces from outside in accordance 
with the favourable circumstances. The Vietnamese had proceeded 
like that at the time of Ho Chi Minh. At present, they go on using 
the same process. 

From 1946 to 1954, the Vietnamest did not come to Kampuchea 
as advisers. They came to rule as secretaries of the party in all fields, 
political, economic and military. They were secretaries of the pro- 
vincial committees and commanders of the military units. Their 
mouths watered when they saw Kampuchea's territory and quarreled 
among themselves about assuming functions in Kampuchea. They 

11 



VIETNAMESE EXPANSION 

from 15th to 20th century 







PANDURAHGA 
(PH»h RAN6,) 

CHEA 

K TR£AH6 (SOC TRAMS) 

M (cochincmima) 



legend 



Champa : 15th-17th century 

Kampuchea Krom : 17th-20th century 
Present limits 



12 



The Activities of Vietnam From 1975 Up To Now 

have been educated in this way for so many generations that it has 
become a reflex. 

It is only after having well discerned these factors that one can 
understand that the cause of the conflict between Kampuchea and 
Vietnam is not an ordinary border problem. The root of this con- 
flict lies in the policy of expansion and annexation systematically 
carried out by the Vietnamese who have used all kinds of methods: 
seduction and peaceful method by grasping the party, the army and 
the State power, and cruel and barbarous military method, like 
those they are carrying out at present in Kampuchea. 



13 



2. THE STRATEGY OF "INDOCHINA 
FEDERATION" OF THE INDOCHINESE 
COMMUNIST PARTY OF HI CHI MINH 



1 . The Indochinese Communist Party 
And Its Political Programme 

The Vietnamese Party was founded in 1930, by the name of 
"Indochinese Communist Party". 

First, the name "Indochinese Communist Party" clearly and suf- 
ficiently means that it is a Party for the three countries of "Indo- 
china". The choice of the name of a Party has its political signifi- 
cance. Lenin, an eminent internationalist leader did not give his 
party the name of "European Communist Party". Thus, the name 
given to the Vietnamese Party means that this party is at one and 
the same time for Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. The choise of 
such a name reveals that the objective of this Party is to dominate 
the three countries. 

Secondly, the Statute of the Indochinese Communist Party has 
stipulated that this party must build up a "totally independent In- 
dochina". The slogan of this party is to wage a struggle for an inde- 
pendent Indochina in order to create an "Indochina Federation". 
Consequently the strategic political programme of the Vietnamese 
Party is the "Indochina Federation". This party has a mission to 
lead Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam in their struggle against French 
colonialism to liberate the three countries, build up a federation 

14 



The Strategy of "Indochina Federation " 

having an entity in the political, economic and military fields and in 
other fields. An entity under the leadership of only one party, the 
"Indochinese Communist Party", which means only one country, 
one people and one army. Since 1930, in order to achieve this 
strategic political programme, the Vietnamese have prepared their 
forces and trained their cadres to successively send them to work in 
Laos and Kampuchea. 

2. The Carrying Out of the Vietnamese Strategy of 
"Indochina Federation" in Kampuchea and 
The Concrete Situation from 1930 to 1970 

a. The Period of 1930 to 1945 

During this period of 1 5 years, the Vietnamese carried out activi- 
ties in Kampuchea and Laos, but they had a lot of weak points. On 
the one hand, their cadres were very few and besides they were en- 
gaged at home. On the other hand, their country was not united. It 
was divided into three parts: Tonkin, Annam and Cochinchina. The 
Indochinese Communist Party was the sole and only Vietnamese 
organization and each of the three parts had a different role. The 
Vietnamese cadres were then busy with their tasks at home. Further- 
more their important centre of activities was in the North and es- 
pecially in Canton (China). In these circumstances they did not have 
enough cadres to carry out activities in Laos and Kampuchea. It is 
one of the reasons why their activities during this period achieved 
no result. Besides, Kampuchea's people as a whole had no idea about 
communism and they hated the Vietnamese. Consequently, the 
Vietnamese did not succeed in infiltrating into Kampuchea. There 
were indeed Vietnamese nationals in Kampuchea, but they were 
not influenced by communism either. In brief, their subjective forces 
were weak and Kampuchea's people were not receptive to their 
propaganda. 

b. The period of 1945 to 1954 

In 1940 - 1941, the Vietnamese launched their armed struggle 
near the border with China and they founded the Vietminh front. 

On March 9, 1945, the Japanese perpetrated a coup. d'etat to 
overthrow the French colonialists. The Vietnamese took this op- 
portunity to increase their influence among their compatriots and 
they mobilized forces to join the Vietminh. On August 19, 1945, 
the Vietnamese took advantage of the Japanese defeat to make the 
"August Revolution" before the return of the French colonialists. 
Later on, they sent a number of cadres to Cochinchina and Kam- 
puchea. 

The Vietminh agents came and militated among the Khmer na- 
tionals belonging to the well-to-do and rich classes in Kampuchea 

15 



The Strategy of "Indochina Federation " 

Krom. They made contact with Pach Chhoeun, Chau Sen Cocsal, 
Chhim Turn, You Chhan, Chea Uom . . . who fled Kampuchea to 
take refuge in Kampuchea Krom after the Japanese defeat and when 
Son Ngoc Thanh, prime minister at that time and tool of the Jap- 
anese militarists was arrested by the French colonialists. 

The Vietminh created a committee of struggle among these 
Khmers, but later on, the latter came back to Kampuchea and they 
surrendered themselves to the French colonialists. 

Facing this situation, the Vietnamese strove to make contacts 
with other Khmers in Kampuchea Krom and their nationals living 
in Kampuchea. Besides, in the Southwestern and Eastern parts of I 
Kampuchea, they kidnapped many Khmer nationals, trained and ] 
used them in order to serve their strategy of "indochina Federation" 
in Kampuchea. 

But the French colonialists also had their policy. They infiltrated 
their men, intelligence agents, policemen, soldiers into the Viet- 
minh ranks. 

Consequently, the first cadres trained by the Vietminh were on 
the one hand, the people it had kidnapped and on the other hand, 
the agents infiltrated by the French colonialists into its ranks. 

In 1947, the Vietnamese had more and more people with them 
and their activities progressively spread over the Northwestern part 
of Kampuchea where they gathered altogether the people left over 
by the gangs of Dap Chhuon, Keo Tak, Houl Vong Anoupheap and 
Chhim Turn. 1 

Later on, in order to carry out their activities inside Kampuchea, 
the Vietnamese organized Kampuchea into territorial zones, includ- 
ing three important zones, namely Southwest, Northwest and East 
zones. In the Northeastern part, the Vietnamese came and installed 
their political and military bases in the Eastern part of Stung Treng 
province, near Bo keo, for in their own country they had neither 
territory nor base. 

Afterwards, the Vietnamese divided the zones into provinces, 
districts and communes. They controlled everything. They had 
their committee to lead and rule Kampuchea, with Nguyen Thanh 
Son as chairman. This Vietnamese committee controlled and led a 
Khmer committee called "Moutkeaha". As for the armed forces, 



1 • Dap Chhuon was a highwayman, agent of the French colonialists and the 
CIA. He succeeded in being appointed governor of Siemreap province and was 
killed during th° coup d'etat he had attempted at the beginning of 1959 with 
the CIA and Ngo Dinh Diem to overthrow the neutral Kampuchea. Kao Tak 
and Houl Vong Anoupheap were highwaymen, agents of the CIA. Chhim Turn 
was one of Dap Chhuon's captains who, later on, surrendered himself to the 
French colonialists. 



The Strategy of "Indochina Federation " 

even in May-June 1954, that is to say, one month before the Geneva 
Agreements, they were almost exclusively composed of Vietnamese. 
The Vietnamese did and ordered everything. They grasped in 
their hands the State power and the army. The names of the organs 
were Khmer but the component elements were Vietnamese. Thus, 
from 1945 to 1954, the first Khmer cadres were made up of the 
people kidnapped by the Vietnamese. The latter had educated and 
used them to develop their forces. 

c. The period of 1 954 to 1970 

After the Geneva Accords, the revolutionaries of Kampuchea 
launched a national movement for independence and neutrality 
against the SEATO's military pact and mobilized the people's 
masses to support the 5 principles of peaceful co-existence or 
Pancha Sila. In Vietnam, Ngo Din Diem slaughtered a big number of 
the party's members and revolutionaries who had been eliminated 
at 70 per cent in 1957-1958. The committee of the Vietnamese 
party for South Vietnam was annihilated. \ After being restored, 
it was once again annihilated. The Vietnamese revolution lost its 
control of the situation and was constantly in a defense position. 
Many Vietnamese revolutionaries then came and took refuge in 
Kampuchea. The neutral Kampuchea became for the Vietnamese a 
rear base they used as shelter to hide themselves and also as a place 
of transit for Hong Kong and Canton in China. 

In 1957, Le Duan, the present first secretary of the Vietnamese 
party also came and took refuge in Phnom Penh and was in transit 
through Kampuchea. All members of the Central Committee of the 
Vietnamese party in South Vietnam were arrested except one who 
came and took refuge in Phnom Penh at Tuol Tapoung district. It 
was Nguyen Van Linh called Muoi Cue, native of North Vietnam. 
He is presently a member of the Political bureau of the Vietna- 
mese party. Hay So also came and took refuge in Kampuchea. In 
the neutral and stable Kampuchea, the Vietnamese could live in 
security. 

Facing their catastrophic situation and in order to escape from 
their total annihilation, the Vietnamese decided in 1960 to wage 
armed struggle again. They came to settle along Kampuchea's 
border, from Kampong Trach (Svay Rieng province) up to Snuol 
(Kratie province). When they met with difficulties, they took refuge 
in Kampuchea. In 1961 they started tc infiltrate into Kampu- 
chea. In 1962 and 1963, they extended more and more their 
penetration, using corruption if necessary. The Vietcongs had been 
able to freely and at will travel throughout Kampuchea. It was on 
the one hand because they corrupted the security agents, policemen 
and civil servants of the former administration, and on the other 
hand, because the people considered the Vietnamese as revolution- 



16 



17 



^mmn^^*^t9^^*m 



^^^WSSHH^" 



™" 



The Strategy of "Indochina Federation " 

aries. In 1965, there were 150,000 Vietnamese (Vietcongs) settled 
In Kampuchea at 2 to 5 kilometres deep from the borders since 
Romeas Hek (Svay Rieng province) up to Ratanakiri, in the region 
called "Naga's tail" in the Far Northeastern part of Kampuchea. In 
1966, this number was up to 200,000 and it still increased in 1967. 
At that time, the Vietnamese uttered lies everywhere to make the 
world over believe that they had achieved "brilliant victories". In 
reality, they took refuge in the Kampuchea's territory. Those who 
did not know this reality, thought that the Vietcongs had come and 
helped the Kampuchea's revolution. In fact, they had no more ter- 
ritory at home, in South Vietnam, because of the Ngo Din Diem's 
policy of strategic hamlets, for Robert Thompson, basing on his 
acquired experiences in other countries, set up strategic hamlets all 
over the territory of South Vietnam so that the Vietcongs had 
neither land nor population. 

The Vietnamese political line on this subject was wrong. It con- 
sisted of "waging the struggle on the spot", of "controlling the pop- 
ulation and keeping them on the spot". For this purpose, the Viet- 
namese organized big demonstrations from 1960 to 1965. But from 
1965, their forces were heavily loose because the enemy controlled 
the population, spread vicious customs and habits among the popu- 
lation, corrupted and depraved them. In the Southern part of Viet- 
nam, the members of the Vietnamese party who lived in the strategic 
hamlets, were all enlisted in the army of the Thieu's clique. 70 to 
80 per cent of the youngsters, members of the Vietnamese party's 
organizations, were enlisted In the enemy's army. The remaining 20 
to 30 per cent complied with the enemy and gave up their struggle. 
There was nobody to lead the struggle of the population who, as a 
whole, were under the control of the US imperialists and Thieu's 
clique. 

From 1961 to 1963, the defence belt of Saigon ran to about Gia 
Dinh. In 1964, it became larger and stretched further beyond Gia 
Dinh. In 1965-1966, it reached as far as the Kampuchea- Vietnam 
border. TheVietcongs came then into Kampuchea to seek refuge 
and set up their various services, armed forces, hospitals, artistic 
groups, transports, commissariat, all their leading organs from the 
central committee up to provincial and district committees. For in- 
stance, the provincial committee of Quang Due was set up at Koh 
Nhek, in Mondulkiri province, Kampuchea. In 1970, the figures of 
the Vietcongs settling in Kampuchea varied between 1.5 and 2 mil- 
lion. There were 80,000 wounded fighters receiving care in the 
hospitals built up in Kampuchea's territory. 

The Kampuchean revolution and people have been the benefact- 
ors of the Vietnamese. They have always granted aid and support to 
th Vietcongs, given them hiding places and shelters, supplied them 
with rice and food. They have granted them aid and support since 

18 






The Strategy of "Indochina Federation " 

1955, that is at the time when Ngo Dinh Diem was launching the 
most violent repression against them. They have granted the Vietna- 
mese aid and support since 1960 at the time when the latter took 
up the armed struggle. Kampuchea's revolution and people acted 
like that, for they considered the Vietnamese as friends and revolu- 
tionaries. However, the Vietnamese, once in Kampuchea, have not 
forgotten their strategy of swallowing Kampuchea. 

Their slogans were "Solidarity among the three countries", 
"Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam are inseparable sworn friends 
fighting against the common enemy". Kampuchea's people and 
revolution believed that they were sincere. Actually, the Vietnamese 
used these slogans of solidarity in order to cover their activities of 
division and sabotage and to infiltrate in Kampuchea's revolutionary 
movement. They worked up the friendship of Kampuchea's cadres 
and population to afterwards introduce them in their organizations. 
They organized those who had carried out the struggle against the 
French colonialists and reinstate them into the Indochinese Com- 
munist Party 1 . Wherever they went they created troubles and dis- 
orders and carried out sabotage and spying activities. From 1967, 
the people and cadres vigorously opposed all these Vietnamese 
activities, but the leaders of Kampuchea's revolution always recom- 
mended them to develop solidarity and mutual help with the Viet- 
namese. As for them, the Vietnamese used that formal solidarity to 
carry out their strategy of "Indochina Federation" in order to annex 
and swallow Kampuchea. Thus, in spite of the difficult situation 
they were facing at that time, the Vietnamese did not give up this 
strategy. 

Through their contacts, the Vietnamese tried to see whether there 
was unity or not with the armed struggle policy of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea. They dragged towards them all those who had 
no firm position. They secretly organized and set up a parallel State 
power. They attacked and ran down the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea by saying that its policy was wrong, Leftist, adventurous 
etc. To the Kampuchea nationals who studied in North Vietnam, 
they handed out: "Leftism, infantile desease of communism" by 
Lenin. They intensified their attacks against the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea when the armed struggle in Kampuchea broke out in 
1968. At the same time, they established contacts at the adminis- 



1. The Indochinese Communist Party was dissolved in 1951, but only in a 
formal way. In fact, this party continues to exist. At the moment of official 
dissolution of the Indochinese Communist Party, the Vietnamese have created 
one party for each country. But in Kampuchea, the "Revolutionary People's 
Party" existed only by name. 

19 



The Strategy of "Indochina Federation " 

trative zones' level in order to spread discord and division within 
the Commimisty Party of Kampuchea. At the same time, they sabo- 
taged Kampuchea's economy. On the one hand, they took to smug- 
gling through black market and on the other hand, they stole food 
from the population: farm products, pigs, poultry, etc. 

All these experiences were very bitter to Kampuchea's people 
and revolution. From 1965, the struggle between Kampuchea's 
revolutionaries and the Vietcongs became very arduous and sharp. 
The Vietnamese came to Kampuchea not only to seek refuges, but 
also to work for annexing and swallowing her. Although they were 
in the most difficult situation, the Vietnamese continued to prepare 
their strategic forces everywhere to overthrow Kampuchea's revolu- 
tionary power at the prospicious moment. 

In the Northeastern part of Kampuchea, the Vietnamese had dif- 
ficulties in carrying on their strategy because of the presence of the 
leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They tried to 
get support from the population, but they failed. As the latter were 
closely united under the leadership of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea, the Vietnamese feared them. They strove to please 
Kampuchea's revolution. They came and asked for the preliminary 
authorization of the Communist Party of Kampuchea before estab- 
lishing their camps, for if ever they had a bone to pick with the 
population, they would be punished by the latter. If they ran into 
the population, they would then lose all political and economic ad- 
vantages. Besides, the region was covered with forests crossed by 
narrow paths which were perfectly known only to the population. 
And with traps and other deadly snares set by the population along 
those paths, the Vietnamese would not be able to run away. The 
Northeastern population are scarce (30,000 to 40,00o inhabitants) 
but the Vietnamese feared them very much for this population are 
very faithful to Kampuchea's revolution. 

In the flat open regions, the Vietnamese succeeded in duping 
some elements among the population and cadres. They got them by 
corruption, material baits or through "Indochinese Communist 
Party" 

In 1 970, the figure of Vietcongs in Kampuchea reached 1 ,500,000 
to 2,000,000. In the Northeastern region, they were from 200,000 
to 300,000. The members of the central committee of the Vietna- 
mese party among them Vo Chi Cong, deputy secretary for South 
Vietnam and secretary of the central zone of South Vietnam, that 
is the 5th Vietnamese zone, were living in that Northeast zone of 
Kampuchea. The Vietnamese army of the 5th zone was dwelling 
there, too. As for the Vietnamese committee for South Vietnam, it 
was also installed in Memot, East zone of Kampuchea. The members 
of this committee were Nguyen Thi Thanh, Pham Hung, Nguyen 
Van Linh called Muoi Cue, Tran Nam Trung, Hay So, Hay Van and 






20 






The Strategy of 'Indochina Federation " 

Vang Van Thai. Nguyen Chi Thanh, responsible for the army, was 
an important personality who would probably have replaced Le 
Duan if he did not die later on. 

By coming and settling in Kampuchea like that, what were the 
role and the situation of the Vietnamese? And what were those of 
Kampuchea? 

Kampuchea's territory became with Laos, the shelter for the Viet- 
namese. Kampuchea thus supplied the Vietnamese revolution with 
aids and supports more than any other country in the world. In 
Laos, the Vietnamese found only shelter. However, in Kampuchea, 
they enjoyed: 

• shelters, including that for the committee in charge of the lead- 
ership of the revolution in South Vietnam. 

• economic bases: the Vietnamese totally relied on Kampuchea. 
They were living thanks to the help given them by the population 
and the purchases they made through local administration. But 
moreover, they looted the goods and food of the population. 

• roads in Northeastern and Eastern regions of Kampuchea linked 
to those from Laos and Kampong Som seaport. The transports car- 
ried from Kampong Som seaport in a month were tantamount to 
the transport carried by the Laotian paths during three years. 

The blessings given to the Vietnamese by Kampuchea's revolution 
were immense. Those who have some sense of justice are perfectly 
aware of this. The Communist Party of Kampuchea has never in- 
formed the world of that. But, on the contrary, the Vietnamese 
have deceived the public world opinion by pretending to have 
helped Kampuchea in everything. 

In brief, from 1930 to 1970, during each period, under any cir- 
cumstances, the Vietnamese obstinately and constantly carried out 
activities aiming at annexing and swallowing Kampuchea through 
their strategy of "indochina Federation". From 1930 to 1945 they 
gained no result. From 1945 to 1954 and up to 1970, thanks to the 
elements they had infiltrated into the ranks of Kampuchea's revolu- 
tion, they succeeded in undertaking some activities in some fields. 
But in the whole, their schemes fell through, for Kampuchea's 
revolution went on strengthening unceasingly its position of inde- 
pendence and sovereignty in political, ideological and organizational 
fields. Furthermore, Kampuchea's revolution enjoyed a better posi- 
tion than the Vietnamese revolution which had neither territory nor 
population, nor economy. 

From 1955, Kampuchea's revolution unceasingly went on con- 
solidating its independence thanks to subjective and objective con- 
ditions. The objective condition was that, thanks to the Geneva 
Agreements, the Vietnamese were forced to pull back. They could 
come back to Kampuchea only secretly to take refuge. The sub- 
jective condition was that Kampuchea's revolution was led by Kam- 

21 



The Strategy of "Indochina Federation " 

puchea's revolutionaries themselves, in full independence. So, the 
revolution could gather together numerous experiences and power- 
fully develop its capacity and competence. In 1966, the Commun- 
ist Party of Kampuchea consolidated and strengthened its position 
of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance, and clearly discerned 
the true nature of the Vietnamese. 



22 



3. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN 

KAMPUCHEA AND VIETNAM ON 

THE ISSUE OF THE POLITICAL LINE 

FROM 1954 TO 1970 



During the period from 1945 to 1954, the revolutionaries of 
Kampuchea who were then struggling against the French colonialists 
were not independent. 

From 1954 to 1970, the struggle opposed the political line of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea, a line of independence, sovereign- 
ty, self-reliance and of determining by itself its own destiny, to the 
political line of expansion and annexation of the Vietnamese party. 
That was a dogged and stubborn struggle. It can be divided into 
two periods. 

1 . Period from 1954 to 1960 

During this period the revolutionaries of Kampuchea didn't yet 
have a party with a clearly defined political line. But they led by 
themselves their revolutionary movement, the open and underground 
struggles in the cities as well as in the countryside. During this peri- 
od, the revolutionary movement of Kampuchea tempered itself in 
the struggle, which allowed the revolutionaries of Kampuchea to 
progressively forge their position of being independent, sovereign, 
of relying on their own forces and determining their own destiny 
as well as thier confidence in their own forces and capability of 
making by themselves their own revolution. It is on the basis of 

23 






The Struggle Between Kampuchea and Vietnam 

these actual experiences between 1954 and 1960 that the revolu- 
tionaries of Kampuchea organized a Congress in order to found the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea on September 30, 1960, to deter- 
mine the strategical and tactical line, to adopt the Statute of the 
Party and to elect the Central Committee of the Party. The revolu- 
tionaries of Kampuchea have then clearly laid down their political 
line and their way. 

When they knew that the Communist Party of Kampuchea had 
been definitively setup, the Vietnamese started to launch systematic 
attacks against the Kampuchea's revolution. To this end they used 
several procedures and especially the two following ones: 

a. They secretly organized another organ of leadership, another 
party 1 , without the knowledge of the revolutionaries of Kampuchea. 
It was at the moment when the revolutionary movement of Kampu- 
chea made great strides, but it was also at the moment when the 
enemy's repression was in full swing. The men they placed in posi- 
tion were the old cadres they had trained before the 1954 Geneva 
Agreements and that afterwards belonged to the Pracheachon group 2 

Some elements of this group openly attacked the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea, when the others carried out manoeuvres of 
seduction. And they launched continuous attacks at the time when 
our Party had not yet achieved its unity in the whole country. Such 
were the activities organized by the Vietnamese against the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea inside the Party itself. 

b. The Vietnamese attacked by themselves the policy of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea. They entirely opposed the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea since 1960. 

• They were against the analysis of the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea concerning the division of Kampuchea's society into classes. 
They pretended that Kampuchea did not yet gather together the 
conditions of a society divided into classes. They asserted that Kam- 
puchea's society had the same characteristics as those in Laos. By 
rejecting the analysis of classes of the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea, it was clear that the Vietnamese were opposed to the whole 
line of the Party. 

• They were against the line of independence and sovereignty of 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea. 



1. The Revolutionary People's Party which has existed only by name (see 
reference (1) page 19). 

2. After the Geneva Agreements, those who had fought against the French 
colonialists laid down their weapons and created a political association to par- 
ticipate in the elections. Most members of this association were trained by the 
Vietnamese during the struggle before the 1954 Geneva Agreements. 

24 



The Struggle Between Kampuchea and Vietnam 

• They also opposed the line consisting of waging at the same 
time the armed struggle and the political struggle. 

To support their arguments, the Vietnamese referred to the reso- 
lution of the 81 parties adopted in Moscow in 1960, which con- 
sidered the defence of the world peace as a priority task. 

2. Period from 1961 to 1970 

In 1961, the Vietnamese continued to attack the political line of 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They worked out a political 
line for the Communist Party of Kampuchea and handed over this 
document in Vietnamese language to the leaders of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea. This document mentioned neither the struggle 
against US imperialism nor class struggle. It was a political line 
which was conspicuous for its confusion. 

From 1962 to 1964, the Vietnamese intensified their attacks. 
They wanted to nip in the bud the movement for carrying out the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea's line, for this movement did not 
yet make great strides. But in 1964, as the people's movement 
started to develop vigorously, the Vietnamese broke out against the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea. They accused it of being adven- 
turist and leftist. In fact, they were frightened by the soaring of 
Kampuchea's revolutionary movement, by the continuous develop- 
ment and strengthening of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
and the revolutionary forces of Kampuchea. Faced with this situa- 
tion, they concentrated their attacks against the line of the Party 
by coordinating their own attacks with those of the group they had 
organized before. These attacks were waged inside the organs of 
leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea itself by leading 
cadres who were agents infiltrated into the Party by the Vietnamese. 

In 1965, the Communist Party of Kampuchea sent a delegation 
abroad. It was the first delegation to pay a visit abroad. It was led 
by Comrade Secretary Pol Pot. The journey was made on foot from 
the revolutionary base in Kampuchea up to Hanoi. 

The delegation of the Communist Party of Vietnam was led by 
Le Duan. 

The talks lasted for a very long time, for the Vietnamese dragged 
on the discussions aiming at deviating the political line of the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea. As a matter of fact, the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea has had a political line of its own and thanks 
to this line, Kampuchea's revolutionary movement has made great 
strides. This made the Vietnamese worried for if Kampuchea's revo- 
lution went on, that would affect their collaboration with the ruling 
classes in Phnom Penh. What was worse, if Kampuchea's revolution 
developed and strengthened in full independence, the Vietnamese 
would not be able to control it. That was why they had to absolute- 
ly deviate this line. 



25 



The Struggle Between Kampuchea and Vietnam 

With this objective in view, the Vietnamese had gathered together 
their points of view in a document for Kampuchea's side. Le Duan 
had psent a lot of his time drafting this document. He had looked 
over and corrected it several times. The Political Bureau of the Viet- 
namese Party had also examined and corrected it. This document, 
written in Vietnamese language mentioned neither class struggle 
nor struggle against the US imperialists. In this document, it was 
written that when Vietnam achieves victory, it would come to liber- 
ate Kampuchea. 

In this document, the Vietnamese carried out a stand-up attack 
against the revolutionary concept and position of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea, so that it would abandon the revolutionary 
struggle and wait until the Vietnamese achieve their victory which 
would automatically bring about the victory to Kampuchea. 

During the talks, the Vietnamese knew perfectly that the Com- 
munist Party of Kampchea firmly abided by the position of inde- 
pendence and sovereignty. That is why they concentrated their at- 
tacks against this position. Le Duan affirmed that in the world it is 
impossible to abide by the position of independence and sovereign- 
ty. One has to rely on others. It is also true for Vietnam. As for the 
three countries, Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, they have to sup- 
port each other. 

This struggle on the issue of the political line was very keen. But 
Kampuchea's side was always patient and serene, and did nothing 
that could give offense to the Vietnamese side. After the departure 
of Comrade Secretary Pol Pot to Kampuchea, the Vietnamese knew 
that the Communist Party of Kampuchea would continue to carry 
out its line which was to wage armed struggle in combination with 
political struggle. 

They then intensified their activities against the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea. In the East and Southwest revolutionary bases, the 
Vietnamese carried out activities aiming at creating confusion and 
division in the ranks of Kampuchea's revolution. They acted by 
themselves and also made to act the Khmer elements they had or- 
ganized for a long time and infiltrated into the ranks of the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea. Abroad, they carried out many activ- 
ities of division. They distributed: "Leftism, the infantile disease of 
Communism" by Lenin, so that the Khmers in Hanoi intensified 
their attacks against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. 

In February 1967 an armed uprising broke out in Samlaut, 
Battambang province. The Vietnamese were panic stricken and in- 
tensified their attacks against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. 
When shortly after, there was a certain lull, they were delighted and 
felt a bit relieved. 

But in 1968, when the armed struggle movement was launched in 
Kampuchea, the Vietnamese once again opposed it. 

26 



The Struggle Between Kampuchea and Vietnam 

In the armed struggle from 1968 to the beginning of 1970, the 
Vietnamese did not help Kampuchea's revolution at all, even though 
their organs of leadership were settled everywhere in Kampuchea. 
The reason was that the two lines, that of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea and that of the Vietnamese Party were entirely differ- 
ent. So, the Vietnamese had to fight against the Communisty Party 
of Kampuchea. Besides, the Vietnamese had to deal tactfully with 
the ruling classes in Kampuchea in order to enjoy their help. 

The Communist Party of Kampuchea asked nothing from the 
Vietnamese, but that they kept quiet and abstained from carrying 
out activities against Kampuchea's revolution and people. But the 
Vietnamese secretly incited the cadres of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea to oppose their Party and continued to set up secret 
networks. 

The political line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was 
correct. If the Party had not led the armed struggle, Kampuchea's 
revolution would have been condemned to disappear sooner or later. 
If it had led only the political struggle, the enemy would certainly 
have destroyed all its revolutionary bases. 

The Vietnamese came and installed themselves in Kampuchea's 
territory and they attacked Kampuchea's revolution. That was the 
highest point of repugnance and ingratitude! Kampuchea's people, 
cadres and fighters who have been victims of the Vietnamese doings 
bear bitterly a profound hatred. 

In 1969, the struggle between Kampuchea and Vietnam reached 
its highest pitch. "Friendship" and "solidarity" were only empty 
words. As for Kampuchea's side, a permanent vigilance was indis- 
pensable. The Communist Party of Kampuchea has never let the 
Vietnamese know the place where its leaders were living. 

All these struggles, waged during the period from 1954 to 1970, 
to make its political line win victory, have allowed Kampuchea's 
revolution to progressively consolidate its line of independence, 
sovereignty and self-reliance. If there had not been this period, 
there would not have been the following period, that is to say, the 
period of independence. The 1954-1 970's period has allowed the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea and Kampuchea's people to very 
deeply temper themselves in the sharp and bitter struggles against 
the Vietnamese. For each year, the differences between Kampuchea 
and Vietnam on important problems of political line were innumer- 
able. They allowed the Communist Party of Kampuchea to progres- 
sively draw rich experiences. 

During this period, the Vietnamese placed in position their de- 
vices aiming at destroying Kampuchea's revolution: 

1. by secretly organizing anti-party groups which acted openly 
against the Communist Party of Kampuchea; 

2. by organizing secret networks within the ranks of the Com- 

27 



The Struggle Between Kampuchea and Vietnam 

munist Party of Kampuchea for their future activities; 

3. by directly attacking by themselves the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea; 

4. by stirring up the people, and the Revolutionary Army of Kam-1 
puchea to oppose the Communist Party of Kampuchea aiming at 
creating difficulties to it for the present and launching strategical 
attacks against it in the future. 

But Kampuchea's revolution, under the leadership of the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea, has crushed all these Vietnamese 
devices, thanks to: 

1 . the correct political line of the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea, a line of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance, of 
deciding by oneself one's own destiny; 

2. the organization's line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, 
which is also an independent and sovereign line. 

The Party has given proof of a great vigilance and safeguarded its 
forces to the maximum. The agents infiltrated by the Vietnamese 
dared not act against the Party, for the overwhelming majority of 
the Party's members were determined to carry out the Party's line. 
The people and the army were united and stood by the Party's side. 
The forces organized by the Communist Party of Kampuchea were 
genuinely national, in the Party as well as in the army and the 
people, for the experience had shown that they did not have to 
think of relying on the Vietnamese. As early as 1966, the Commun- 
ist Party of Kampuchea judged that it could have only State rela- 
tions and other official relations with Vietnam, for there was a 
fundamental contradiction between Kampuchea's revolution and 
the Vietnamese revolution. The Vietnamese wanted to put Kam- 
puchea's revolution under their thumb. 

In 1970 after the coup d'etat, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea drew further lessons from the 
1954 Geneva Agreements: Kampuchea's revolution had obtained 
nothing, for it was not independent. The Central Committee spread 
this lesson to all members of the Party. If it had not done so, Kam- 
puchea's revolution would have still relied on the Vietnamese and 
the latter in return would have taken the advantage by suppressing 

3. About the People Trained and Organized by the Vietnamese 

After the Second World War, the Vietnamese came to Kampuchea 
and kidnapped Kampuchea's nationals in order to train them, organ- 
ize them, and use them as cores for progressively developing their 
forces* . From 1946 to 1954, these people were under the total lead- 
ership of the Vietnamese and relied entirely on them. They could 



1. See Chapter 2,2 b. Period from 1945 to 1954, page 15. 
28 



The Struggle Between Kampuchea and Vietnam 

do nothing and understood nothing by themselves. The Vietnamese 
decided and ordered everything in their place. That is why when 
I hey were forsaken by the Vietnamese after the Geneva Agreements, 
I hey could do nothing. As they were puppets, they knew nothing 
about politics, they were incompetent to do anything and had no 
revolutionary position. After the Geneva Agreements, when the 
mission of leading the revolution fell on them, they were not able 
to assume it. At that time, the Vietnamese set up a provisional com- 
mittee of leadership. But it was only in 1957 that some revolution- 
aries were informed of it. 

After Geneva, left alone, this provisional committee of leadership 
collapsed by itself, like a house of cards at the slightest puff of air, 
without being touched by anybody. 

Therefore there were real Kampuchean revolutionaries who faced 
the situation. They went on accomplishing their revolutionary tasks. 
Some of them took the responsibility of activities in the capital and 
prepared the 1955 elections. In order to fulfill these preparations 
successfully, there were revolutionaries who came from the country- 
side and got in touch with those in the capital. These contacts al- 
lowed those responsible in Phnom Penh to make acquaintance with 
I he cadres in the whole country. Through these contacts and ac- 
quaintances, the responsible revolutionaries of Phnom Penh played 
by that very fact the role of liaison committee for the whole country. 

After the 1955 election, the enemy started their repression. The 
people trained by the Vietnamese were scattered. Some of them 
abandoned the struggle and some others betrayed and served the 
enemy. This situation did nothing but promote the development of 
the activities of the committee of Phnom Penh throughout the 
country. That explains why Kampuchea's real revolutionaries have 
been able to continue to wage the struggle. 

It is quite normal that puppets are inactive as soon as their masters 
no longer pull the strings. The Vietnamese had no intention to for- 
sake them at all, but they were forced to do so by historical circum- 
stances. The Communist Party of Kampuchea and the whole people 
of Kampuchea have drawn this lesson: when one is a puppet, one 
lias no life at all as soon as the master stops pulling the strings. To 
live again, a new master has to be found. Only independence per- 
mits one to live on, whatever circumstances may be. 

The people trained and organized by the Vietnamese gave up the 
revolution. Nevertheless, in 1963 - 1964 some joined the maquis 
and placed themselves under the leadership of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea. But, when the Vietnamese came back to 
Kampuchea in 1970, they picked them up again and reintegrated 
them into their networks which have been somewhat developed. 
But these renegades were not able to succeed in their criminal activ- 
ities, for the Party has been very strongly organized. However the 

29 






The Struggle Between Kampuchea and Vietnam 

Vietnamese have always maintained these networks and have 
secretly carried on the activities against Kampuchea's revolution. 
They used these renegades in their several attempts to destroy Kam- 
puchea's revolution in 1973, 1975 and afterwards. But they always 
failed. 

In consideration of all these events, the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea has declared that: 

• the glorious victory of April 17, 1975 has allowed Kampuchea's 
people to gain back their national soul. It is an achievement of a 
very important and deep significance. Indeed under the domination 
of the colonialists and imperialists, one part of Kampuchea's revolu- 
tionaries have undergone a rather strong influence of these latter, 
but another part of the revolutionaries have received the Vietna- 
mese influence. Consequently their national position has been per- 
verted and shaken. With the glorious victory of April 17, 1975, they 
have well discerned that this victory has been won by themselves 
and their Party. That is how the national pride, the national posi- 
tion, the national honour and dignity, the national consciousness 
and the national soul were born in them. 

The Communist Party of Kampuchea has constantly educated 
our people to reinforce and develop all these revolutionary virtues, 
so that the objective external factors cannot carry them away, as 
was the case of the Vietnamese puppets during the armed struggle 
against French colonialists after the Geneva Agreements, when their 
Vietnamese masters abandoned them or also when these latter 
came back to Kampuchea in 1970. The Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea was born in an independent revolutionary movement, and it 
was only by relying on its own independent revolutionary' move- 
ment that it has been able to have its own experiences, whether 
right or wrong, bitter or stimulating. 



30 



4. THE VIETNAMESE ATTEMPTS AT 

SMASHING THE INDEPENDENT 

POLITICAL LINE OF THE COMMUNIST 

PARTY OF KAMPUCHEA FROM 

1970 TO 1975 



1 . The Situation of Kampuchea Before the Coup D'etat: 
Vietnam Violently Opposed the Polital Line 
Of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. 

In 1969 the situation in Kampuchea was getting more and more 
tense. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampu- 
chea grasped the situation well and perfectly knew that the U.S. 
and Lon Nol were going to make a coup d'etat. It thought that if 
the U.S. carried out the coup d'etat, this would drive new forces to 
the revolution's side. Thus, it was necessary to get ourselves ready 
to receive these forces The coup d'etat would be nothing but posi- 
tive for the revolution. That is why the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea elaborated a document about the 
Party's line on the National United Front. It criticized the state- 
ments of the intellectuals who had joined the maquis and attacked 
Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. It considered that those statements 
ran counter to the Party's line on the National United Front, for 
they should rather have attacked the U.S. imperialists and the trai- 
tor Lon Nol. The Party rectified these mistakes and mobilized all 
forces capable to be mobilized to fight and isolate the enemy. 

31 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 

By the end of 1969, a delegation of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea went to Hanoi for talks with the Vietnamese Party. 
The delegation led by Comrade Secretary Pol Pot, made the journey 
on foot. The Vietnamese delegation was composed of Le Duan, Le 
Due Tho, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh. 

The Vietnamese were not pleased and opposed the struggle waged 
by the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The situation in Kampu- 
chea became worse and was not favourable for the Vietnamese. The 
Vietnamese delegation was quite irritated. In spite of its efforts to 
preserve diplomatic courtesy, it could neither bridle its violent hos- 
tility towards the Kampuchea's revolution nor control its fury 
against the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Although he was un- 
derhanded and deceitful, Le Duan could not control himself. The 
talks took place in a very tense atmosphere, for the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea adopted a position of offensive and armed 
struggle, having in mind that Kampuchea's revolution would be de- 
stroyed if it did not abide by this position. As for the Vietnamese, 
they wanted the Communist Party of Kampuchea to give up the 
armed struggle and lay down its arms. Consequently the contra- 
diction between the two positions was irreducible. 

The reasons for which the Vietnamese wanted the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea to lay down its arms were, on the one hand 
those of strategical order for they feared that the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea would acquire political and military forces and ex- 
periences in armed struggle, and on the other hand they feared that 
the revolutionary forces of Kampuchea could be developed and 
strengthened in all fields. On the other hand, the Vietnamese had to 
cooperate with Lon Nol who was then in power in Kampuchea and 
they were afraid of jeopardizing this cooperation if Kampuchea's 
revolution waged armed struggle. However, the first reason was 
more important. Le Duan said: "According to the Vietnamese ex- 
perience, the armed struggle is to be avoided. Kampuchea's com- 
rades should rather wait until Vietnam wins victory. At that mom- 
ent, we will strike one single blow and we will liberate Phnom Penh." 
The aim of the Vietnamese manoeuvres was clear. They wanted: 

1 . to lure the Communist Party of Kampuchea to have confidence 
in the Vietnamese forces, to rely on them and to be dependent on 
them; 

2. to make the Communist Party of Kampuchea give up the armed 
struggle. And if the Communist Party of Kampuchea gave it up, the 
revolutionary forces of Kampuchea would be destroyed. The Viet- 
namese would then get an open field. In their assessment, the Viet- 
namese believed that if the Communist Party of Kampuchea follow- 
ed their advice, it would adopt an irresolute leadership, pending 
between the armed struggle and the wait-and-see policy. The forces 
of the Communist Party of Kampuchea would be assaulted by the 

32 






The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line of C.P.K. 

enemy at one and the same time, both in military and political 
fields, and would then be destroyed. The Vietnamese could then re- 
proach the Communist Party of Kampuchea for being unable to lead 
and say that it should now let them lead and reorganize the revolu- 
tionary forces. 

Indeed, the Vietnamese had already installed some of their forces. 
One part of which were in Kampuchea and another one outside. If 
ever the inside forces were destroyed by the enemy's repression, 
I hey would then use the outside ones. 

The reasons brought up by the Vietnamese delegation to con- 
vince the Communist Party of Kampuchea of giving up the armed 
struggle were numerous. They were asking the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea: 

• where and how could the Communist Party of Kampuchea be 
supplied with weapons, ammunitions and other materials? 

• how could it get doctors and medicine? 

• where and how could it find the necessary finances? 

The delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea did not 
take into account the objections raised up by the Vietnamese, for 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea had to wage the armed strug- 
gle because the concrete situation did not allow it to do otherwise. 
If it did not wage the armed struggle, it would be condemned to 
vanish. But if it persisted in this struggle, its existence would be 
assured. 

During the stay of the delegation of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea in Hanoi, Le Duan wanted to induce the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea to establish relations with the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union. He reported that the Soviet Ambassador 
in Hanoi would like to meet the delegation of the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea to invite it to pay a visit to Moscow. 

The delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea told Le 
Duan that the Communist Party of Kampuchea did not oppose the 
Soviet Union. Its tasks consisted only of achieving its objective 
which was to lead Kampuchea's revolution to victory. It did not 
want to interfere in the China-Soviet difference. But the Soviet 
Union has shown its hostility towards the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea. Indeed, in 1964, the Soviet Embassy in Phnom Penh 
strove to set up in Kampuchea another communist party and charged 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea with being an inefficient Party 
and of having an absurd line. The communist party that the Soviet 
Union wanted to set up should have been made of on the one hand 
the renegades at the time of the struggle against the French colonial- 
ists, such as Siv Heng and Pen Youth who became intelligence agents 
in the Lon Nol clique's pay and on the other hand the students 
from the Khmero-Sovietique Technical Institute in Phnom Penh. 
But in the end, that party could not come to life for lack of people's 

33 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 

support. Concerning the meeting that the Soviet Ambassador was 
asking for, the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
answered that it would be better to postpone it. 

Before going to Hanoi, the Communist Party of Kampuchea had 
asserted that in the talks with the Vietnamese, it had to be in a 
strong position. Of course, at that period, the Vietnamese could 
spend thousands of dollars to corrupt the army and police of the 
Lon Nol clique, but they took refuge in the territories which were 
revolutionary bases controlled by the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea. They then needed help from Kampuchea's revolution. If 
ever they created any difficulties for Kampuchea's revolution, they 
would not have any territory for their refuge. 

The Vietnamese used open threats against the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea and all the members of the delegation of the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea were unanimous in saying that the 
Vietnamese were furious and were capable of suppressing them. 
They could easily resort to assassination. Indeed,the delegation was 
practically in their hands, in their country, and for their journeys 
there and back, they had to cover long distances on foot. But the 
Vietnamese had an imperative requirement of help and assistance 
from the Communist Party of Kampuchea which controlled im- 
mense areas of Kampuchea's territory. And they feared the violent 
reactions of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and of Kam- 
puchea's revolutionaries in case the leaders of the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea, and namely its Secretary were assassinated by them. 
The atmosphere of the talks and stay in Vietnam was so tense that 
some members of the delegation of the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea, who were not used to such tests, were greatly shaken. 

2. The March 18, 1970 Coup D'etat: Vietnam Praises the 
Political Line of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
and Implores Aid and Assistance of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea 

Until the March 18, 1970 coup d'etat, the relations between 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Vietnamese party 
had been very tense. 

Before the coup d'etat, the Vietcongs could not take refuge 
in their country simply because they had not liberated the slight- 
est plot of territory. The 3rd defence belt of Saigon set up by the 
U.S. and the Thieu clique was stretching as far as up to Kam- 
puchea's border. It was from Kampuchea's territory that the Viet- 
congs went out fighting the U.S. and Thieu 's clique. That was a 
fact known to everybody. 

On March 18, 1970, the coup d'etat broke out in Kampuchea. 
Later on, the U.S. invaded Kampuchea to 20 kilometres deep. This 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofCP.K, 

belt of territory was then transformed into a battlefield. The U.S. 
and Thieu's clique set up the 4th defence belt of Saigon inside Kam- 
puchea. Ten thousand Vietcongs more took refuge in Kampuchea. 

Afterwards, the U.S. and the troops of Theiu's clique were ad- 
vancing up to the Mekong River and the National Road No. 4 link- 
ing Phnom Penh with Kompong Som. In Kampong Cham province, 
they broke in as far as the locality of Troeung. One could say that 
their 5th defence belt reached the Mekong river, turning the Viet- 
congs out to the very inside of the territory of Kampuchea. 

The Central Committee of the Vietnamese party for South 
Vietnam came and took refuge in the North of Stung Trang, on the 
western bank of the Mekong river, at the boundary of Prek Prasap's 
district, in Kratie province. The Vietcongs then launched their 
military operations against the U.S. and Thieu's troops from Prek 
Prasap. 

After the talks with the Vietnamese in Hanoi, the delegation of 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea went to China for talks with 
the Chinese Communist Party. When the coup d'etat broke out in 
Kampuchea, the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
was then in Peking. As for Prince Norodom Sihanouk, he had left 
Paris, paid an official visit to Moscow and arrived in Peking on 
March 19, 1970. At that moment, the delegation of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea was carrying on its talks with the Chinese Com- 
munist Party. Pham Van Dong arrived in Peking some days later to 
meet respectively Prime Minister Chou En-lai, Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk and the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. 

Prince Norodom Sihanouk adopted a definite position against 
Lon Nol since his arrival in Peking. But in the first two day's, he 
adopted a defensive position. Comrade Secretary of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea made clear to Prime Minister Chou En-lai that 
politically Prince Sihanouk should be in the offensive position and 
not in the defensive one. From the third day, Prince Norodom Si- 
hanouk switched over to the offensive. He drafted a solemn declara- 
tion proclaiming the dissolution of Lon Nol's government and as- 
sembly, the founding of the National United Front, the Government 
of National Union and the National Liberation Army, the socialist 
and even communist construction in Kampuchea. The delegation of 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea examined and modified the 
political programme of the National United Front drawn up by 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Through comrade Chinese leaders, Com- 
rade Secretary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea let Prince 
Norodom Sihanouk 1 be informed that he should firstly, constantly 



1 . Prince Norodom Sihanouk was not aware that the Secretary of the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea was at that moment in Peking. 



34 



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The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 



stand in the offensive position and secondly stand in the framework 
of the National United Front in order to gather the national forces 
for the democratic forces were already under the leadership of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea. 

That was why the March 23, 1970 declaration denouncing and 
condemning the coup d'etat of national treason, proclaimed the dis 
solution of the government and assembly traitors to the nation, and 
the founding of the National United Front, the Government of Na 
tional Union and the National Liberation Army. There was no 
question of socialism or communism in that document. 

As soon as he arrived in Peking, Pham Van Dong met Prime Min 
ister Cho En-lai. He was already aware of the position of the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea, when he came and met the delegation 
of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. There was nothing but 
friendship and solidarity. But his main objective was to have the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea help and defend the Vietnamese 
forces in difficulties. He said that the U.S. imperialists had already 
created serious difficulties and inflicted considerable losses in men 
and materials on the Vietcong troops who had no more territory in 
South Vietnam to take refuge. Now, the U.S. imperialists and Lon 
Nol had staged the coup d'etat. It was as if they stabbed the Viet- 
namese in the back. 

The Vietnamese were then in the following situation: 

• ahead, the U.S. imperialists and the army of Thieu's clique 
had wiped out the Vietcong forces from South Vietnam. Now, the 
U.S. and the troops of Lon Nol's clique hit them from the rear. The 
U.S. carried out deadly bombing on Kampucneas territory, all 
along the border zones, bringing down the Vietcong bases. At the 
same time they dropped troops with prefabricated blockhaus be- 
hind the VIetcongs. In a word, the Vietnamese recorded a funda- 
mental setback. During the talks with the delegation of the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea in Hanoi, some time before the coup 
d'etat, Le Duan told Comrade Secretary Pol Pot that the Vietna- 
mese had met with serious difficulties. They had no territory in 
South Vietnam to take refuge, no economic base, no foodstuffs, 
no population. When the troops from North Vietnam came to South 
Vietnam, only 20 per cent were in a fit state to fight. As for the 
wounded soldiers in the hospitals installed in Kampuchea's territory, 
there were 80,000. When the coup d'etat broke out in Kampuchea, 
the Vietnamese were in a more critical situation. 

Such was the gloomy situation of the Vietnamese. For this reason, 
when Pham Van Dong met the delegation of the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea in Peking after the coup, he was pouring out friendly 
words and embraces with the Secretary of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea. What a difference with the meeting in Hanoi! It was a 
sudden change at 180° . 

38 










39 



IS 




41 




The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofCP.K. 

For the Communist Partyof Kampuchea, the coup d'etat, as it 
was said above, could not be but positive to the revolution of Kam- 
puchea. The Communist Party of Kampuchea was not worried 
about it and was already preparing itself to this eventuality for 
more than six months. It had foreseen that right from the breaking 
out of the coup, it would immediately switch over to the offensive 
to take over the power in the countryside by military actions and 
armed insurrections. 

Facing these events, all the Party was ready for fighting and united 
as one man on the political line as well as on the concrete actions. 

As for the Vietnamese, they were very anxious and anguished be- 
cause before the coup, they had violently opposed the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea and the talks with the delegation of the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea had been extremely tense. So, they 
were afraid that the Communist Party of Kampuchea would refuse 
help and assistance to them. The Vietnamese situation was already 
so critical that without the help and assistance of Kampuchea's 
revolution, it would be fatal. 

The Vietnamese were actually "genial" politicians! Before the 
coup d'etat, there were for the Vietnamese the following four 
forces: 

1 . the Communist Party of Kampuchea, 

2. the khmers in Vietnam under the Vietnamese control, 

3. the khmers inside Kampuchea and in the Vietnam's pay, 

4. the Vietnamese forces themselves. 

The Vietnamese have used the three latter forces to fight against 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They have fought by them- 
selves the Communist Party of Kampuchea and rallied on the forces 
of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and especially on those of Lon Nol 1 . 

Therefore, before the coup d'etat, the Vietnamese had the follow- 
ing cards: 

1 . Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Lon Nol, 



1. In 1967, after the armed uprising in Samlaut, Battambang province, in the 
northwestern part of Kampuchea, The Vietnamese sent Nguyen Van Linh called 
Muoi Cue and a general, Tran Nam Trung called Hay Hauv, to meet the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea in order to persuade it to give up the armed strug- 
gle. Kampuchea's side answered that it had to fight against Lon Nol, the U.S. 
imperialists' lackey, because he was waging a campaign of total repression 
against Kampuchea's revolution. The Vietnamese affirmed that Lon Nol was 
a man of the French not the U.S. According to their information, Lon Nol had 
no money in the banks abroad. He could not thus be regarded as a reactionary. 
Besides, Lon Nol has rendered many services to the Vietnamese revolution. But 
as for Kampuchea's side, one thing was sure: Lon Nol was dead set against the 
communists and the revolution. He represented the ultra-militarists, the ultra- 
feudalists and the ultra-reactionaries. After 10 days of talks, both sides parted 
with their respective positions. 

43 




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45 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 

2. their men and secret networks infiltrated in the ranks of Kam- 
puchea's revolution, 

3. their men outside Kampuchea. 

When the U.S. and the Lon Nol clique overthrew Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk, and together with Thieu's clique, fought against the Viet- 
congs, the Vietnamese had no more cards to play. 

1. The Lon Nol card went out of their hands definitively, while 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk turned over to the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea. So, the Vietnamese lost the first card. 

2. As for the second card, that is their secret infiltrated men and 
networks in the ranks of the revolution of Kampuchea, the Vietna- 
mese could not use it, for they could not control the situation of 
Kampuchea in war. 

3. At last, concerning the third card, that is that of their men out- 
side Kampuchea, circumstances did not allow them to use it either. 

After the coup, the situation radically changed. The world public 
opinion supported Kampuchea's revolution. The Vietnamese had 
only one card to play: it was to turn towards the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea and ask for help and assistance from it. They had no 
scruples about coming and embracing the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea, after having shamelessly insulted and fought against it. 

If the Vietnamese made an about face towards the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea, it was only because the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea had forces which were progressivly being built up in 
full independence and sovereignty. If the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea had only a political line and no forces, it would have been 
paralyzed and condemned to vanish. If there had been no Commun- 
ist Party of Kampuche or if the revolutionary bases in Kampuchea 
had been destroyed, the Vietnamese would not have escaped from 
annihilation. If the Lon Nol Clique had succeeded in hanging on to 
power and if the revolution of Kampuchea had been wiped out, the 
Vietnamese would have been led to destruction. 

Therefore, the services and aid granted to the Vietnamese by the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea and Kampuchea's people were in- 
commensurable. At the moment when they were condemned to 
annihilation, the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Kampuchea's 
people had saved them. However the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea has never talked about that. On the contrary, the Vietna- 
mese have spent their time hiding the truth and deceiving the world 
public opinion, the Vietnamese people and army by making them 
believe that they have given considerable aids to Kampuchea. But 
nobody can falsify deeds. The role played by Kampuchea's revolu- 
tion was priceless. By the aid granted to the Vietnamese, it has 
brought about an important and active contribution to the revolu- 
tionary movements in Asia and throughout the world. 

Before, one used to say that the key problem was in Vietnam. 

46 




47 



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48 



Vietcongs' sanctuaries in Kampuchea's territory in 1965 

Vietcongs' sanctuaries in Kampuchea's territory in 1970 

Vietcong's QG in May 1970 

Center of the Vietnamese Committee No. 559 in Kampuchea, 
charge of transport through Laos and Kampuchea 

Center of the Vietcongs' command of the 5th Region of 
South Vietnam 

Vietcong administrative center of Quang Due Province 

Vietcong administrative center of Song Be province 

Command center of the Vietcong's units taking refuge in the 
Southwest zone of Kampuchea 

Sancuaries of the Vietnamese divisions No. 5, 7 and 9 



, 







49 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line of C.P.K. 

But the March 1 8, 1 970 coup d'etat revealed the role of Kampuchea's 
revolution. In 1970, when the delegation of the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea was in Peking, the Chinese comrades told it that 
Pham Van Dong had told them about the serious difficulties met 
with by the Vietnamese and that he had asked them to intercede 
with the Communist Party of Kampuchea so that the latter would 
agree to help them. The Chinese comrades themselves were perplexed, 
for they had always heard that the Vietnamese helped Kampuchea. 
The delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea told them 
about the actual situation: the Vietnamese had no territory at home 
and took refuge in Kampuchea. They installed there their organs of 
leadership and command, their troops' quarters, their hospitals, etc. 
etc. . . 

The Chinese comrades found out the truth for the first time, for 
the Vietnamese had until then hid it from them. The Chinese com- 
rades have highly appreciated the attitude of the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea and paid greater attention to Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk. They did it also in the spirit of solidarity with the 
Vietnamese. 

The Vietnamese had an urgent need for the help of the Commun- 
ist Party of Kampuchea. Kampuchea's revolution was their savior. 
So, when the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea ar- 
rived in Hanoi on its way home after the visit to China, it was greet- 
ed by them all with a delirious joy and extremely warm embraces. 
At the banquet, the delegation of the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea was highly praised by its hosts from the beginning to the 
end. Before the coup, everything done by the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea was condemned by the Vietnamese. Now, anything 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea did was correct and praise- 
worthy. Before, when Comrade Khieu Samphan joined the maquis, 
the Vietnamese reproached the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
for making an erroneous decision. Now that he was in the National 
Union Government, they congratulated the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea for having made a judicious decision and for having got 
ready well in advance. 

So, the Vietnamese had an urgent need for the friendship, and 
assistance of Kampuchea. Pham Van Dong talked profusely. So 
did Le Duan, Le Due Tho, Vo Nguyen Giap and the others. But 
in their embraces, Vo Nguyen Giap, always boorish and not very 
courteous, let out his reflexion: "It is a historic occasion that al- 
lows our three parties to unite once again." 

These words reflected well the policy of the Vietnamese who had 
not given up their plan of placing Kampuchea under thier domina- 
tion. Therefore, the Vietnamese were" not only satisfied with the 
help and assistance of Kampuchea for their survival, but they already 
thought that, once out of danger, they would swallow Kampuchea 

50 






The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line of C.P.K, 

The Vietnamese have never given up their ambition to annex and 
swallow Kampuchea. Even at the moment when they had to face 
llieir greatest difficulties, they persisted in concocting all kinds 
of manoeuvres to sate this ambition. 

When it arrived in Hanoi, the delegation of the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea prepared its journey back to Kampuchea. At that 
lime, the Vietnamese put their manoeuvres into shape in two direc- 
tions: the first one outside Kampuchea when the delegation of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea still stayed in Vietnam, the second 
one inside Kampuchea. 

.}. The Vietnamese Manoeuvres towards the Delegation of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea on its Passing Through 
In the Vietnamese Territory 

For the Vietnamese leaders, the problem of the liberation of 
South Vietnam was not their big concern. For them, the problem of 
Kampuchea was far more important. Indeed, for 15 years, Kam- 
puchea went off from their control. They need at all costs to take 
again control of Kampuchea, even if South Vietnam was tempo- 
rarily to be sacrificed. They believed that once Kampuchea fell into 
their hands, they would be certain to win the victory in South 
Vietnam. 

The Vietnamese thought that they could attain their end by se- 
duction. The Vietnamese leaders asked for a meeting with Comrade 
Secretary Pol Pot to discuss secret military problems. At the talks, 

1 . they proposed the creation of mixed commands Vietnam- 
Kampuchea, 

2. they proposed to give 5,000 rifles to the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea, 

3. they asked the Communist Party of Kampuchea to help them 
in the following fields: installation of shelters in Kampuchea, facili- 
ties for the use of communication roads in Kampuchea's territory 
in order to link with Laos, economic aid and food supply. 

4. they proposed common activities on the international arena, 
to oppose U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. 

It was Le Duan himself who made all those proposals. Le Due 
Tho stressed the point that the Vietnamese troops needed to be 
supplied on the spot, for the means of transportation were not suf- 
ficient even just to get the troops and military equipment moved 
lo South Vietnam. 

The Vietnamese already profited by Kampuchea's aids in eco- 
nomic fields as well as in foodstuffs and refuges, but they asked that 
these aids should be increased. Before the coup, they relied on Lon 
Nol's clique and the former regime's officials they had bribed. But 
alter the coup d'etat, the Vietnamese had to ask for the agreement 

51 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 

of the Communist Party of Kampucha. Concerning the 5,000 rifles, 
the Vietnamese used them as a bait to ease the talks, especially to 
get some political concessions from the Communist Party of Kam 
puchea. Indeed, what the Vietnamese were longing for more than 
anything else was the creation of the mixed commands which would 
be mixed only by name, but in fact they would be Vietnamese 
They hoped to control everything through those organs. 

Comrade Secretary Pol Pot replied to the Vietnamese that the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea conceived a friendship basec 
upon the principle of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, of non-interference in each other's interna 
affairs, of equality and reciprocal benefits 1 . As for the 5,000 rifles 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea was ready to accept them ac 
cording to the Vietnamese possibilities. Furthermore, the delegation 
of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was not entitled to decide 
the creation of the mixed commands, for it had left Kampuchea be 
fore the coup d'etat and the Central Committee had only entrusted 
it with the mission of talking about friendly relations between the 
two parties. So, no decision on this problem would be made with 
out the advice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party o 
Kampuchea. However, Comrade Secretary Pol Pot added that in hi 
opinion, the creation of the mixed commands would meet wit! 
numerous difficulties. Indeed: 

1 . in the political field, the people and the National United Front 
would not have confidence in Kampuchea's revolution and in Viet 
nam. They would see that Kampuchea's revolution was not inde- 
pendent. In these conditions, it would not be possible to mobilize 
forces. Neither the people, nor Prince Norodom Sihanouk, noi 
Samdech Penn Nouth would accept that. 

2. in the technical field, those mixed commands would be a 
source of complications, for they would inevitably bring about con 
flicts. According to the experiences of the past struggles, there weri 
numerous conflicts in the mixed units. So, it would be better tha 
each side kept up its own organizations and that the cooperatio 
be made on this basis. 

The talks lasted three hours and the Vietnamese left quite u 
happy with the results. 

Let us notice that on his way back from Peking, the very day o 



1. In his speech delivered in 1965 on the occasion of his first visit to Hanoi 
Comrade Secretary Pol Pot already had the opportunity to state the principlef 
on which the Communist Party of Kampuchea conceived friendship. All tha 
Vietnamese leaders, including Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giapl 
were irritated, for never had a "young brother" or a "son" had so far dared tf 
give such a speech before his "elder brother" or his "father". 

52 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 

Ins arrival in Hanoi, the Vietnamese handed in to Comrade Secre- 
i;i ry Pol Pot a telegram from Comrade Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea. 
It was also the day before the meeting with Le Duan. But the Viet- 
namese had given only the second half of the text of the telegram. 
In this part of the text, Comrade Deputy Secretary informed them 
that he had held talks with the Vietnamese and that both sides had 
llgreed on the solidarity and cooperation for fighting against the U.S. 
imperialists. 

Comrade Secretary Pol Pot at once understood what was about, 
for the Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea had already discussed and set up to- 
gether the framework of this solidarity and cooperation with the 
Vietnamese. Besides, the fact that only a part of the text was handed 
to him proved that the Vietnamese deliberately hid all the content 
Of the telegram in order to mislead the delegation of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea. Indeed, they took care to give only the part 
Of the text where it was a question of agreements between the two 
■ules. But, during the talks, the delegation of the Communist Party 
Ol Kampuchea firmly abided by the fundamental principles adopted 
hy the Party and not by the telegram. It was only in the evening of 
(he day after, that is after the talks, that the Vietnamese handed 
(he first half of the text of the telegram to Comrade Secretary Pol 
Pot. That part of the text dealt with different positive aspects and 
difficulties on the question of independence and sovereignty as well 
as solidarity. All these facts show that the Vietnamese had no 
scruples about censoring words or phrases in the telegram, provided 

I hat it could serve their interests and ambitions. 

The delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea believed 
I hat in Hanoi, the Vietnamese would not yet dare suppress the lead- 
ers of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to achieve their aims, 
hecause they needed Kampuchea's revolution. Besides, they feared 
not to be able to get out of the mess in which they were in and 
they feared the reactions and repressions which could be disastrous 
lo them. Had they not needed the help of Kampuchea's revolution, 
(he Vietnamese would have used all means to prevent the delegation 
of the Communist Party of Kampuchea from going back to Kam- 
puchea. But they needed the presence of Comrade Secretary Pol 
Pot in Kampuchea to face the situation, not in the interest of Kam- 
puchea's revolution but in their own. The U.S. imperialists, Thieu's 
i lique and all the reactionary forces have gathered in Kampuchea. 
So, the Vietnamese had to mobilize the maximum forces to face the 

I I nation. Otherwise, they would have then suppressed the leaders 
<•(' the Communist Party of Kampuchea. 



53 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 

4. The Vietnamese Manoeuvres in Kampuchea 
Aiming at Taking Over the State Power 

a. The Vietnamese wanted to set up mixed 
commands and mixed organs of power. 

While the delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea was 
still abroad, the Vietnamese increased their contacts with all the 
zones' committees in Kampuchea, particularly with those of the 
Northeast and East. At that time, Comrades Ieng Sary and Son Sen 
were responsible for the Northeast zone. The Vietnamese General, 
Minh, responsible for the Central Vietnam zone, came and met 
with the two comrades and told them that Comrade Secretary Pol 
Pot and the Central Committee of the Vietnamese party had agreed 
to create mixed commands. To this end, the Vietnamese decided to 
place at Kampuchea's disposal 200 beds and all medical staff, cooks 
included. (The Vietnamese wanted even to teach Kampuchea how 
to cook rice!) 

The meeting was held in a very tense atmosphere, and did not 
come to any result, for Kampuchea's side abided by a position of 
independence and sovereignty whereas the Vietnamese wanted to 
swallow Kampuchea. That General Minh was very tenancious. De- 
spite that he was told by Comrades Ieng Sary and Son Sen that 
Kampuchea needed nothing and that they had received no directives 
from Comrade Pol Pot on this matter, he obstinately refused to 
leave, pretending shamelessly that Comrade Secretary Pol Pot al- 
ready came to an aggreement with this matter. But by that time (it 
was in the beginning of May 1970) the U.S. and Thieu's troops 
massively invaded the region. The B-52's bombed and heavy artillery 
pounded intensively and helicopters landed troops with blockhaus. 
The Vietnamese, including first of all General Minh got frightened 
and ran away. 

Such were the manoeuvres of the Vietnamese in the military 
field. In the parallel direction with those manoeuvres, Vo Chi Cong, 
secretary of the Vietnamese 5th zone, responsible for the High 
Lands in South Vietnam, came and negotiated with the responsibles 
of the Northeast zone of Kampuchea. He proposed cooperation be- 
tween Kampuchea and Vietnam in the State power organs. Vietnam 
would supply cadres at the level of districts, communes and villages 
as well as cadres and technicians for setting up the State poweij 
organs. Vo Chi Cong was eager to make it clear that on the Vietna 
mese side, everything was kept ready. Only the agreement from 
Kampuchea was being awaited 

Comrades Ieng Sary and Son Sen replied that Kampuchea is mas 
ter of the situation and she is all by herself capable of assuming the 
function of the State power. As far as Vietnam was concerned, it 
was up to the Vietnamese to take necessary measures. Comrade Ieng 

54 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 

Sary was bent on adding that during the time of fighting against the 
Trench colonialists, the Vietnamese monopolized everything, and 
from this fact the Khmers knew nothing. 

In spite of their failure, the Vietnamese did not throw in their 
hand. They went to Attopeu to meet Comrade Secretary Pol Pot 
who, on his way home, arrived at Se Sou, East of Attopeu, in Laos. 
In their report to Comrade Secretary Pol Pot, they deliberately told 
lies according to which Comrade Ieng Sary has already come to an 
agreement with the Vietnamese proposals and that he was only 
waiting for the decision of Comrade Secretary. The latter perfectly 
understood that the Vietnamese were lying, for according to the 
method of work and direction of the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea, any decision should be collectively taken. Besides, in Hanoi, 
the Vietnamese already tried to play him a nasty trick. 

Comrade Secretary Pol Pot answered them that he had not yet 
received the report on that matter and asked them to patiently wait 
until he arrived in Kampuchea. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese re- 
fused to get off and went on insisting on their claims. But a Vietna- 
mest colonel, native of South Vietnam and responsible for the es- 
cort unit, understood the reasonable speech of Comrade Secretary 
l } ol Pot and criticized the behavior of the Vietnamese envoys, charg- 
ing them with discourtesy and with preventing Secretary Pol Pot 
from taking any rest after such a long journey. He then turned them 
out. 

When he arrived in Kampuchea's territory, Comrade Secretary 
Pol Pot first stayed in the Vietnamese shelter. The Vietnamese en- 
voys followed him and overtook him. Comrade Ieng Sary who came 
to greet him was also present. 

The Vietnamese envoys took the opportunity once again to renew 
all their proposals in more pressing terms: mixed commands, Viet- 
namese cadres for the villages, communes and districts, technicians, 
hospitals, etc. But Comrade Secretary Pol Pot told them that he had 
to wait for the decisions of the Central Committee. 

The Vietnamese were very unsatisfied. And when Comrade Secre- 
tary left their shelter for that of Kampuchea's side, the Vietnamese 
did not move to accompany him. 

In the East zone, the Vietnamese tried to carry out the same 
manoeuvres. They proposed to set up organizations in all fields for 
Kampuchea. Even for women's works, the Vietnamese women 
Nguyen Thi Dinh offered to come and educate Kampuchea's women, 
to teach them how to work. In fact, that Nguyen Thi Dinh did not 
I. now how to do anything, either housework, or mass political work, 
nor military work. Actually the Vietnamese wanted to control 
Kampuchea's people like they did during the fighting against the 
French colonialists. 



55 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 

b. The Vietnamese secretly organized a 
parallel State power in Kampuchea. 

After the coup d'etat in March 18, 1970, the Vietnamese organ- 
ized the Vietnamese nationals dwelling in Kampuchea, armed them 
and used them as particularly ferocious tools of oppressing against 
Kampuchea's people. Kampuchea's people hated them and gave 
them the nickname of "Vietnamese of local make". These Vietna- 
mese nationals proved themselves to be more cruel in their repres- 
sion than their compatriots coming from North Vietnam, for they 
knew the Khmer language and the inhabitants. They persecuted the 
population for nearly one year, that is until 1971 . 

The Communist Party of Kampuchea launched a struggle against 
those Vietnamese nationals at one and the same time by raising 
strong official protests and mobilizing mass people to organize wide- 
spread demonstrations against them. The revolutionary power dis- 
armed them and those who refused to lay down their arms were ar 
rested. 

In the parallel direction with the activities of those "Vietnamese 
of local make", the Vietnamese secretly organized a parallel State 
power in Kampuchea, particularly in the East Zone where they could 
achieve some implantations, for they had their agents there. In the 
Southwest they also tried to do it, but did not achieve any signifi 
cant result. It was only in early 1971 that the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of Kampuchea knew the existence of that 
parallel State power. It asked the Vietnamese to dissolve it. 

c. The Vietnamese secretly organized a parallel 
army in Kampuchea 

The Communist Party of Kampuchea never received a single rifle 
of the 5,000 promised from the Vietnamese. The latter used those 
rifles to arm adventurers, bandits, delinquents, former soldiers o 
policemen dismissed by Lon Nol's regime. The Vietnamese gathere( 
those men and organized them in battalions, companies, platoons 
etc. to set up a parallel army in which soldiers were Kampuchea na 
tionals and cadres were Vietnamese. In the East zone, they succeedec 
in setting up two battalions, that is about 600 men. It was the same 
in the Southwest zone. 

When the Communist Party of Kampuchea knew the existence o 
this parallel army, it demanded that the Vietnamese hand them 
over to it. As they feared that the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
and Kampuchea's people would not supply them if they refused to' 
comply with this demand, the Vietnamese handed over one part of 
the troops to the Communist Party of Kampuchea. But they 
secretly kept another part by continuing to secretly enlist new mei 
as a reserve force able to be further used against the Communis 
Party of Kampuchea and Kampuchea's revolution. 
56 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 
d. The Vietnamese secretly organized military 

training and medical training schools in Kampuchea. 

In the Northeast zone, the Vietnamese wanted to open a military 
1 raining school for Kampuchea. But the Committee of this zone re- 
fused. 

In the East zone in 1970, the Vietnamese secretly opened a mili- 
lary training school. They gathered some Kampuchea nationals from 
some regions of this zone to carry out some lessons on military tech- 
niques at the level of chiefs of platoon or company. Always in secret, 
I hey also opened medical training schools for medical staff, lectured 
on radio-telegraphy and administration of State power organs. At 
l lie beginning, the Communist Party of Kampuchea was not aware 
of those activities because in the East zone, there were several hun- 
dreds of thousands of Vietnamese and also some Khmer elements 
belonging to the Indochinese Communist Party who carried out 
clandestine activities. It was only in the middle of 1971 that the 
Central Committee had been aware of those activities. 

The Central Committee then gave directives to all zones to close 
down those schools created by the Vietnamese. Indeed, the Party 
had already opened military training and medical training schools 
for the whole country. Those schools spent as much time in political 
education as in technical training. 

Implementing the directives of the Central Committee, the East 
/.one closed down the Vietnamese schools. But the Vietnamese al- 
ready succeeded in turning out two promotions of military training 
and one promotion of medical training. Those, who have been train- 
ed in the Vietnamese schools had a conception quite different from 
that of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, as much in the po- 
litical line as in the organizational and fighting lines. 

5. The Vietnamese Wanted to Annihilate the Leadership 
Of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in November 1970 

In June 1970, Comrade Secretary Pol Pot came back to Rata- 
nakiri, Northeast zone. By mid-Semtember 1970 after having or- 
ganized the preparations for the mission of Comrade Ieng Sary 
abroad, he went down to the South of the country and arrived in 
the commune of Boeng Lovea, district of Santuk, Kampong Thorn 
province. In October 1970, the Central Committee of the Commun- 
ist Party of Kampuchea held a full session to take stock of the gen- 
eral situation in the country in order to wage the national liberation 
war. From 1960 to 1970, the Central Committee was endowed 
with a solid unity of conceptions and positions. The full session in 
October 1970 further strengthened this unity in the pursuit of the 
struggle. It was unanimous so that: 

• the Party, the United Front, the Army and the Government 

57 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line of C.P.K. 

had to firmly abide by the position of independence, sovereignty 
and self-reliance and of deciding by themselves their own destiny, 
in all fields ; 

* the foreign policy had also to be in the position of independ 
ence and sovereignty in order to mobilize all forces and keep urjj 
good relations with all friends, 

* with Vietnam, solidarity would be made by abiding by the po-j 
sition of independence, sovereignty and by being always vigilant, 
for the Vietnamese were used to constantly wage activities of sabo- 
tage and destruction against Kampuchea's revolution. 

In November 1970, the Vietnamese asked for talks with the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea on the problem of the development of 
solidarity and cooperation. It was official negotiations. On the Viet- 
namese side, there were Nguyen Van Linh called Muoi Cue, secretary 
of the South Vietnam zone, and Tran Nam Trung. 

On Kampuchea's side, there were Comrade Secretary Pol Pot and 
Comrade Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea. 

The meeting was held at a bend of Stung Chinit river, moving 
from North to West, that is at 30 kilometres from the refuge of 
Comrade Secretary Pol Pot and 40 kilometres from the refuge of 
the Vietnamese central committee. 

At that time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea knew that the Vietnamese were very perfidious. How-; 
ever, it had not been aware of thier secret plan aiming at assassinat- 
ing the leaders of the Communist Partyof Kampuchea. It was onhl 
in 1976 that it was aware of it. 

During the talks, the Vietnamese once again put forward the same 
problems: mixed organs of State power, military and technical train- 
ing schools, etc. They also renewed their demands for aids already 
mentioned by Le Duan in Hanoi in April 1970, that is sanctuaries, 
facilities of communication, foodstuffs, etc. 

The Communist Party of Kampuchea agreed to their demands, 
but asked them to make no attempts at carrying out underminingr 
activities among the people and the Revolutionary Army of Kam- 
puchea, Kampuchea's side politely let them understand that she was| 
totally self-sufficient as much in the State power as in the army. All 
that time, the Communist Party of Kampuchea already got a fairly 
great quantity of armaments at its disposal, and in every zone, it 
already had several battalions. 

The negotiations lasted one week. On that occasion, Muoi Cue 
did not have his meals twice. He pretended to have eaten enough 
fruits. He slept less, too. In fact he was thinking a lot. As represent^ 
tive of his party, he had to adopt a definite position regarding the 
decisions of Kampuchea. That was for him a turning point which he 
had to carefully turn over in his mind. It was at that moment that 



58 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofCP.K. 

lie came to the conclusion that he ought to eliminate the leaders of 
I he Communist Party of Kampuchea. 

After the negotiations, the leaders of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea had perfectly been aware of that. However the analysis 
was not yet complete. In fact, the Vietnamese decided to eliminate 
(he leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea ever since the 
hitter had turned down their proposals put forward in the Northeast 
;ind East zones 1 . At the talks in November 1970, the Vietnamese 
hied to have Comrade Secretary Pol Pot and Comrade Deputy 
Secretary Nuon Chea poisoned by their agents infiltrated inside the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea. So, the Vietnamese attempts at 
assassinating the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
dated from 1970. 

The talks were held in the North zone, called zone 304. It was 
the secretary of this zone, Koy Thuon 2 who organized the talks and 
it was his wife who cooked on that occasion. 

When he was arrested in 1976, Koy Thuon revealed the plot: 
Men San 3 ordered him to carry out this odious work and handed to 
him the poison that he had received from Tran Nam Trung. The 
latter was commissioned to spy and sabotage Kampuchea's revolu- 
tion. 

As the Communist Party had taken strict measures of vigilance 
and had at the kitchen comrades faithful to the Party, this Vietna- 
mese heinous crime failed. 

Therefore, in November 1970, the Vietnamese tried to annihilate 
the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, for they 
could not win it over to their cause. From that date, they did not 
refrain from carrying out activities to destroy the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea. It was a new turning point for them because they 
had no more possibilities, neither to destroy Kampuchea's revolu- 
tion, nor to swallow Kampuchea by legal or organizational means, 
and they had to resort to other methods and means. 

The attempts at coups d'etat they set forth, thair acts of aggres- 
sion and invasion against Kampuchea were not much surprising. The 



1 . See Chapter 4 4 page 54 and so on 

2. Koy Thuon was a CIA agent since 1958, who infiltrated in the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea in 1960. 

.}. Men San was kidnapped by the Vietnamese in 1946 and changed his name 
to Ney Sara.nn. After the 1954 Geneva Agreements, the Vietnamese forsook 
him. He became the CIA's agent in 1955. In 1960 he infiltrated in the Com- 
munist F'arty of Kampuchea. When he joined the maquis, the Vietcongs, 
agents of the CIA, contacted him again. As a double agent, he was at the same 
lime at the service of the CIA and the Vietnamese. In the CIA's network, he 
occupied a higher position than that of Koy Thuon. It was him who com- 
manded Koy Thuon. 

59 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 

Vietnamese have carried out and are carrying out all kinds of crimi- 
nal activities aiming obstinately at annexing and swallowing Kam- 
puchea. 

6. The Criminal and Fascist Acts of the 
Vietnamese Against Kampuchea's People 

In a parallel direction with their acts aiming at assassinating the 
leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, and their activities 
aiming at setting up a puppet army and a puppet State power, the 
Vietnamese have carried out extremely fascist criminal acts against 
Kampuchea's people. 

Kampuchea's people fed and sheltered the Vietnamese who had 
penetrated into Kampuchea's territory. But in return, the Vietna- 
mese, cadres and fighters, imposed upon the hospitality of Kam- 
puchea's people and acted as a big power, colonialists, feudalists 
and masters of Kampuchea. They despised Kampuchea's people. 
They raped young girls, arrested and shot down cadres of the vil- 
lages and communes of Kampuchea. They got in all housings and 
occupied them at their will. The responsibles of each locality told 
them to call for the responsible organizations and to abide by the 
decisions of the latter. In Kampuchea, the Vietnamese acted as 
masters, even worse than the French colonialists. Here is an exam- 
ple. In the East zone, the Vietnamese settled in a house of the in- 
habitants of a village. They were served a meal with chicken soup. 
In the countryside, chicken is only served on exceptional occasions, 
not often in ordinary meals. However, the Vietnamese refused to 
eat and clamoured for another dish of meat. They were told that 
there was nothing else and that in killing the chicken, the utmost 
efforts had already been made. The Vietnamese went angry and 
threw to the ground all the food, the chicken soup included. 

The population of Kampuchea seethed with deep hatred towards 
the Vietnamese so that it was not necessary to conduct campaigns 
to arouse it. The Vietnamese who raped girls were punished. They 
kep on creating incidents. The high levels of the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea have always strived to smoothe things over as much 
with the Vietnamese as with the population. 

After the Paris Agreements, from February to August 1973, the 
U.S. imperialists were launching a savage air war against Kam- 
puchea's revolution carrying out intensive bombing, days and 
nights, against Kampuchea. The Vietnamese took the opportunity 
to create additional difficulties for the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea. 

In July 1973, in Southwest zone, the Vietnamese behaved bari 
barously in a former revolutionary base of Kampuchea, in Sre Knong 
village, district of Chhouk, Kampot province. They arrested the 

60 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofCP.K. 

chairman of the committee of the village and when the inhabitants 
were demonstrating to demand his release, they beat the inhabi- 
tants. They arrested monks, women and children, kept them in a 
single house with the chairman of the committee of the village and 
set fire to the house. They threatened the population with their 
rifles to prevent them from coming close. They had then burned 
;ilive six people. 

In that zone, the Communist Party of Kampuchea did not have 
important armed forces. On the contrary, the Vietnamese had two 
regiments set up along road No. 4, from road No. 3 to Kampot. 
Their headquarters was at Amleang where their liaison Committee 
with the Committee of the Southwest zone of Kampuchea was. 

Having been aware that the Vietnamese had burned alive the in- 
habitants, the guerilla units of the village and the population of 
this area counter-attacked them. The population and the Revolu- 
tionary Army of Kampuchea from other localties learned of the 
crimes of the Vietnamese, attacked them everywhere and even in 
Amleang, until the Vietnamese fled to Kampong Trach, in Kampot 
province. They fled at the same time from the U.S. air bombings, 
the Lon Nol Clique's army and the Red Khmers! In spite of their 
modern weapons, they met with heavy defeats inflicted on them by 
Kampuchea's people who relieved one another to drive them out. 
The Vietnamese lost about 500 men. Kampuchea's side lost about 
100 men. 

The central committee of the Vietnamese party then asked the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea to help them to remedy the situa- 
tion. Comrade Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea received a letter from 
liay So in which he stated that he implored with tearful eyes the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to help 
him to solve the problem, even if he had to suffer all punishments. 
The Communist Party of Kampuchea sent in the secretary of the 
Southwest zone to remedy the situation. 

The expulsion of the two Vietnamese regiments from Amleang 
fully satisfied the population. It was helpful to Kampuchea's revo- 
lution, more especially as the Communist Party of Kampuchea had 
shown maganimity in sending in on the spot the secretary of the 
Southwest zone to solve the problem and in allowing the Vietna- 
mese to gather themselves in Kampong Trach as they had asked for. 
The Vietnamese suffered an ignominious defeat. Before, they could 
live in peace and tranquility up to Kampong Chhnang, now after 
the incidents they had provoked, they were driven out to Kampong 
Trach. And having no territory to take refuge, they had to implore 
for help from the Communist Party of Kampuchea. 

Abroad, the Vietnamese slandered and denigrated Kampuchea's 
revolution aiming at isolating it. Pham Van Dong even complained 
before the Chinese comrades that Kampuchea did not want to be in 

61 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 

solidarity with Vietnam, that she has abolished all the armed forces 
set up by Vietnam for her and refused any Vietnamese technical 
assistance. 

The Chinese comrades reported those Vietnamese complaints t(| 
the representative of the Communist Party of Kampuchea in making 
it clear that this problem would depend only on Kampuchea. The 
representative of the Communist Party of Kampuchea told the Chi- 
nese comrades that Kampuchea's revolution is independent and 
sovereign but that if Kampuchea's revolution has bound itself with 
Vietnam, it would not be able to wage the struggle, because even in 
the bosom of the Party, there would not be unanimity. All the 
more among the people who hated the Vietnamese! 

7. The Vietnamese Plan to Overthrow the Revolutionary 
Power of Kampuchea and to Set Up a New Communist Party 

a. In 1973, the Vietnamese planned to overthrow once again the 
revolutionary power of Kampuchea. To this end, they were relying 
on: 

1 . their infiltrated agents in Kampuchea, 

2. their agents living in Hanoi, kept in reserve for further needs, 
in case the first ones would be all eliminated. 

Their agents inside Kampuchea participated in the State power 
and in the army, especially : 

1 . some members of the Indochinese Communist Party particu 
larly in the East zone, 

2. the East zone army in which they succeeded in infiltrating the 
elements trained in their military schools. 

The Vietnamese thought that the U.S. imperialists air war against 
Kampuchea was for the most part powerful and that the Kam- 
puchea's revolutionary forces too would be certainly destroyed. 
Consequently, they created a party and an army to join their 
own army in order to attack the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
and seize the power in the whole country. They called this party 
by the name of "Workers' Party". They created a central committee 
for this party which included their agents living in Kampuchea and 
those living in Hanoi. 1 

But this Vietnamese plan failed, because: 

l.the U.S. imperialists air war against Kampuchea's revolution 
did not bring in the results they had hoped for. Even if the U.S. 
imperialists had carried on this war, they would not have achieved 
any better results. The U.S. planes did not succeed in causing big 



1 . At that time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
was not aware of this Vietnamese plan. It had been informed only later on. 



62 






The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 

damages to the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, for the latter 
was constantly on the move, 

2. the Vietnamese did not have enough forces (their own forces 
and those of their infiltrated agents in Kampuchea as much in the 
Party and in the Army as among the people). 

On the contrary, the Communist Party of Kampuchea and Kam- 
puchea's people were united in a single block. The determinant 
factor is the people. 

b. In 1975, the Vietnamese wanted once again to overthrow the 
revolutionary power in Kampuchea. In 1974 the Vietnamese re- 
ceived information according to which the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea was getting itself ready to launch the final offensive to 
liberate Phnom Penh and the whole country. 

That was the reason why the Vietnamese had set up their plan as 
follows: 

1 . They were strengthening and developing their forces to get 
themselves ready for the action. They set too much hope on their 
agents in the East zone. 

2. As soon as they have liberated Saigon, they would launch many 
dozens of their divisions to attack the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea and Kampuchea's revolution and set up in Kampuchea their 
own State power. They made arrangements to liberate Saigon in the 
1976's dry season, that is in late 1976 — early 1977 1 , and according 
to their assessment, they thought they would liberate Saigon before 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea could liberate Phnom Penh. 
They did not believe that the Communist Party of Kampuchea was 
going to liberate Phnom Penh in 1975. 

On January 1, 1975, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea 
launched their ultimate offensive. This offensive was carried out 
without a stop during January and February. But the U.S. imperial- 
ists and the Lon Nol clique thought that the Red Khmers could not 
afford to keep up their offensive any longer than three months for 
lack of ammunition. The Vietnamese thought the same way, for the 
ammunition was in their hands and they did not want to carry it for 
Kampuchea's revolution. Besides, they thought that the U.S. imper- 
ialists big power would not let the small Kampuchea inflict defeat 
on it. 

But on February 26, 1975, the Revolutionary Army of Kam- 
puchea completely cut off the Mekong river. From that time, the 
Vietnamese began to be really worried. Late March 1975, their cen- 
tral committee asked for a meeting with the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea. One of the reasons that pre- 



1 . At the time of the presidential elections in the United States of America. 

63 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 

vented the Vietnamese from attacking Saigon was their fear of the 
U.S. interventions. That was the reason why they wanted to know 
whether or not the U.S. imperialists would intervene, once Phnom 
Penh is liberated. The Communist Party of Kampuchea told the 
Vietnamese that, according to its evaluation of the situation, the 
U.S. imperialists would not dare to intervene, for their forces have 
been already crushed. In the United States, the American people 
were struggling to claim back the remains of the American soldiers. 
If the U.S. imperialists sent 10,000 more men to intervene in 
Kampuchea, the U.S. government would have had to search back 
for at least 1,000 new American bodies. 

Based on this evaluation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, 
the Vietnamese mobilized then all their forces in North Vietnam to 
launch attacks in South Vietnam. But, without the victory of 
Kampuchea, it would be difficult for them to liberate Saigon. 

The Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea liberated Phnom Penh 
on April 17, 1975. The radio of the United Front in Phnon Penh 
broadcast the news on the same day at noon, announcing that 
Phnom Penh had been liberated at 9:30 a.m. 

In Hanoi, the Vietnamese did not believe their ears. Comrade 
Ieng Sary himself who was at that time in Hanoi, told them that 
Phnom Penh had been liberated, but they still did not believe it. 
The Vietnamese did not want to believe it for on the one hand, the 
liberation of Phnom Penh before that of Saigon deprived them of 
any hope to achieve their plan of taking possession of Kampuchea, 
and on the other hand, this was a very painful strike to their honour 
and prestige. The Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi at that time had their 
face cadaverous and was livid with rage, for: 

1 . Kampuchea won victory before Vietnam, 

2. their plan to take possession of Kampuchea automatically fell 
in. 

8. The Ungrateful Nature of the Vietnamese Towards the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea which had rescued 
Them From Total Collapse from 1970 to 1975 

During the period 1970 to 1975, Kampuchea's revolution saved 
the Vietnamese who were like drowning men engaged in sinking. 
Kampuchea's revolution successfully defended the soil of Kam- 
puchea, offered sanctuaries to the Vietnamese and supplied them 
with food, so that they could recover their forces and go back to 
fight on their own soil. But the Vietnamese are still more ungrateful 
than crocodiles. 

At the very moment when Kampuchea's revolution was saving 
them from collapse, they wanted to knock it down in order to take 
possession of Kampuchea. From 1970 to 1975, not only did the 



The Vietnamese Attempts at Smashing the Independent Line ofC.P.K. 

Vietnamese help Kampuchea in nothing, but they still came and 
carried out sabotage, and attempted to systematically destroy Kam- 
puchea's revolution. In 1970 in the Northeast zone, the Vietnamese 
secretly destroyed the war booties of the Revolutionary Army of 
Kampuchea, sabotaged the heavy artillery's pieces, broached drums 
full of gasoline, destroyed medicine, etc. At that time, the Revolu- 
tionary Army of Kampuchea was short of everything and the Viet- 
namese did everything they could to restrain the move forward by 
Kampuchea's revolution. They opposed anything that could make 
Kampuchea's revolution independent. That was the reason why on 
the battlefields, there were often fights between the revolutionary 
Army of Kampuchea and the Vietnamese. Our fighters could no 
longer bear with them, in spite of the constant recommendations 
made by the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea to pre- 
serve the solidarity with the Vietnamese. 



64 



65 



5. THE PARIS NEGOTIATIONS 

AND THE VIETNAMESE ATTEMPTS 

AT DESTROYING KAMPUCHEA'S 

REVOLUTION 



1 . The Contents of the Talks Between the Communist Party 
of Kampuchea and the Vietnamese in 1970 - 1971 

During their numerous talks, the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
and the Vietnamese exchanged their views on their respective situa- 
tions. 

a. The Vietnamese often talked about the new effectives enlisted 
by Lon Nol's army, the air and naval forces and the artillery pieces, 
etc. of the latter. The Vietnamese wanted on the one hand to point 
out to the Communist Party of Kampuchea that according to their 
estimation based on technical data, the enemy was powerful and 
on the other hand, to frighten the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
so that the latter would ask for Vietnamese help and assistance 
lhat was their main objective. 

But the Vietnamese manoeuvres were ineffective, for the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea analyzed the situation differently From 
mid-1970 to the end of 1971, the people living in the area under 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea's control increased from 70 
per cent to 80 per cent of the whole population (and this number 
grew unceasingly the years after). At the same time, the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea was controlling the countryside and conse- 
quently, the economy as well. As for the armament and ammuni- 

66 



The Paris Negotiations 

tion, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea progressively captured 
them from the enemy. 

b. The Vietnamese talked about Saigon's defence belts established 
by the U.S. and Thieu's clique. After the coup d'etat, this Saigon 
defence belt penetrated into Kampuchea's territory and then reached 
up to the Mekong river. Thieu's clique came up to Neak Luong. In 
the Southwest of Kampuchea, they reached up to National Road 
No. 4. The Vietnamese said that their situation was not good. The 
Communist Party of Kampuchea's position and analysis were dif- 
ferent: in aggressing Kampuchea, the U.S. imperialists and Thieu's 
clique relied on Lon Nol's forces, that is on the "Khmerization of 
the war". Their forces coming from outside were not the permanent 
ones. They could only launch some big operations from time to 
time. That was a reality. Concretely, the route of the military opera- 
tion "Chenla 2" was also the route of the "Khmerization of the 
war". After their strategic forces had been decimated, the enemy 
could not launch big military operations anymore. And neither the 
"Vietnamization" nor the "Americanization" of the war has suc- 
ceeded. 

c. The Vietnamese expressed their thanks to the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea, especially for the sanctuaries, the facilities in 
using communication lines, food, etc. given to them by the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea. They said that they had so many 
troops that it would be impossible to supply them from Hanoi. 
Consequently, they needed all that Kampuchea had. The Vietna- 
mese expressed their thanks in words, but indeed they did not give 
up their underhanded and perfidious activities and manoeuvres. 

2. The Paris Negotiations Between the Vietnamese 

and the U.S. and the Vietnamese Manoeuvres Aiming at 
Destroying Kampuchea's Revolution 

a. The situation in mid- 1972 

When the 1970 coup d'etat broke out in Kampuchea, the nego- 
tiations held since 1968 between Vietnam and the United States 
were going on in Paris. In 1971, the Vietnamese and the U.S. were 
out of breath. So, from 1972 the Vietnamese started to exert pres- 
sure on the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They also carried on 
activities on the international arena to this end. 

In 1972, during the talks between the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea and the Vietnamese, the latter raised a lot of problems. But 
the fundamental problem was that of the negotiations to stop the 
war. At the beginning, they made it clear several times that Kampu- 
chea had to negotiate. In mid-1972, their pressures became stronger. 
At the talks, Nguyen Van Linh called Muoi Cue was replaced by 
Pham Hung. The latter came as secretary of the committee of the 

67 



The Paris Negotiations 






Vietnamese party in South Vietnam and at the same time as respon- 
sible for the army. The Vietnamese sent Pham Hung, for they 
thought that their former representatives did not have enough 
ability to negotiate with the Communist Party of Kampuchea. At 1 
that time, in Paris, the negotiations between Le Due Tho and 
Kissinger reached a general agreement on a cease-fire. The Central 
Committee of the Vietnamese party entrusted Pham Hung with 
negotiating with the Communist Party of Kampuchea and forcing 
it to cease fire. 

During the talks with Kampuchea's side, Pham Hung said that 
Vietnam could not carry on any longer the war which already lasted j 
30 years. It had to stop the war. Le Duan had already said the same 
thing to Comrade Secretary Pol Pot in 1970. The Vietnamese were 
driven into a situation where they thought they had to snap up the 
baits launched by the U.S. imperialists, that is: 

1 . cease-fire and elections 

2. U.S. aid of more than 3,000 million dollars. 
But Kampuchea was the obstacle. 

b. The Vietnamese threats and pressures forcing the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea to negotiate 

The Vietnamese agreed to negotiate with the U.S. imperialists and 
to cease-fire, for they could no longer carry on the war and were en- 
ticed by the U.S. baits. But at the same time, they did not forget 
their strategy of swallowing Kampuchea's territory: they wanted to 
force Kampuchea to negotiate so that she would become their 
satellite. They did not want Kampuchea to carry on the struggle, if 
not, Kampuchea would win victory and become independent, and 
they would then not be able to control her anymore. In 1954, Viet- 
nam, Laos and Kampuchea were altogether at the Geneva negotia- 
tions. In 1972, the Vietnamese wanted that it would be the same at 
the Paris negotiations. 

Thus, the Vietnamese exerted pressures on Kampuchea so that 
she would accept negotiation. They tried to do their utmost so that 
the situation in Kampuchea became at least as unfavourable as their 
situation. The most important thing for them was that Kampuchea 
would not be able to escape from their control. They would accept 
to lose all together with Kampuchea if they had to, provided that 
they could be in a dominating position with regard to Kampuchea. 

From mid-1972 up, talks between Kampuchea and Vietnam took 
place every month. As Kampuchea's delegation always kept silent 
about the Paris negotiations, after 2 or 3 meetings, the Vietnamese 
asked for its opinion. The Communist Party of Kampuchea's dele- 
gation put back this question in return: "Whom to negotiate with?". 
'Would we have to negotiate with the Lon Nol clique? But the lat- 
ter was already dying. The people were striking powerful blows at 

68 



The Paris Negotiations 

him. In 1972, the "Khmerization" and the "Vietnamization" of the 
war in Kampuchea had already been smashed. The Communist 
Party of Kampuchea was already planning the great strategic offen- 
sive. In such a situation, there was no advantage at all to negotiate 
with Lon Nol. Would we have to negotiate with the U.S.? Kampu- 
chea's revolution did not have to negotiate with the aggressors of 
Kampuchea. They had to stop their aggression and to withdraw 
from Kampuchea. Besides, the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
had nobody to carry out negotiations. 

The Vietnamese replied: "In our opinion, Kampuchea's comrades 
must negotiate If Kampuchea's comrades have no cadres to carry 
out negotiations with the U.S., we can do it in their place. 

The Vietnamese impudence is boundless! 

In October 1972, the Vietnamese pressures became more im- 
perious. In fact, the U.S. and the Vietnamese had already put the 
broad outline of the draft of Paris Agreements into shape. Pham 
Hung and Hay So asked to meet once again with the Central Com- 
mittee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The talks lasted 4 
days instead of the initially scheduled 2 days. During the talks, the 
Vietnamese have shown their rare insolence and were in a towering 
rage. Both sides expressed once again their points of view and each 
side kept abiding by its position. The Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea yielded nothing under the Vietnamese pressures. 

Therefore, the reason for which Kissinger refused to sign the 
Paris Agreements in October 1972 was the refusal of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea to yield under the Vietnamese pressures. 

In January 1973, Pham Hung asked to meet Comrade Secretary 
Pol Pot. During the talks which were held from January 24 to 26, 
Pham Hung said that according to the information he received from 
his central committee, Kissinger and Le Due Tho had reached a de- 
finitive agreement. The Agreement text was already initialed and 
waited only for the signatures. Pham Hung gave a copy of it in Viet- 
namese language to Comrade Secretary Pol Pot and he made some 
commentaries on the terms and conditions of the elections scheduled 
to be held after the signature of the Agreements and on the U.S. aid 
to Vietnam. He added that after the elections the Vietnamese party 
was sure to win over the South Vietnamese people to its side. 

Kampuchea's side pointed out to him that the same argument 
was held at the moment of the Geneva Agreements in 1954. In spite 
of all the support given by Kampuchea's people to it Kampuchea's 
revolution had obtained nothing at the elections. Kampuchea's side 
did not mention anything about the problems concerning Vietnam. 
The Vietnamese became more and more threatening, which made 
the talks very tense. But as the talks took place in Kampuchea's 
territory, they had to be cautious. 

Comrade Secretary Pol Pot replied to Pham Hung: "We will re- 

69 



The Paris Negotiations 

spect what the Vietnamese comrades will decide concerning their 
affairs. As for us, we will not cease fire. We will carry on the fighting 
and we are sure to win victory." 

At the end of the talks, the Vietnamese had obtained nothing. 
Pham Hung was very angry. He raised two problems: 

1 . He said that he would leave in Kampuchea the whole Vietna- 
mese army taking refuge there, including the military installations, 
the Commissariat and transports. The Vietnamese behavior was 
worse than that of the colonialists I They did not at all ask advice of 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea about their proposal to let 
their army stay in Kampuchea's territory. They said that they would 
leave them stay in Kampuchea! When Kampuchea's side replied to 
them that Kampuchea already had enough armed forces at her dis- 
posal, the Vietnamese became crimson with rage. If the talks had 
taken place in Vietnamese territory, Pham Hung would surely have 
banged on the table! 

2. At the moment when he was about to go back home, Pham 
Hung said that he had been entrusted by the Vietnamese party to 
inform the Communist Party of Kampuchea that on the day of their 
meeting to finish off the text of the Agreements, Kissinger asked Le 
Due Tho to inform Kampuchea's side that if Kampuchea did not 
cease fire, the U.S. strategic and tactical planes would destroy Kam- 
puchea within 72 hours. That was an open threat uttered to the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea. 

On January 27, 1973, the Vietnamese and the U.S. signed the 
Paris Agreements. The Communist Party of Kampuchea had already 
taken all steps to face the situation. The whole Communist Party of 
Kampuchea, the whole Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea had 
studied this situation and got ready to face all eventualities. 

When Comrade Secretary Pol Pot came back home, he received a 
letter from the central committee of the Vietnamese party in South 
Vietnam and addressed to the Central Committee of the Commun- 
ist Party of Kampuchea. This letter only confirmed Kissinger's 
threats underlining that if Kampuchea did not cease fire, he would 
totally destroy Kampuchea's revolution within 72 hours. The Viet- 
namese asked the Communist Party of Kampuchea to more carefully 
consider the problem. Did Kissinger really talk like this? Probably. 
But anyway, the Vietnamese were involved in this affair. 

In the evening of January 26, 1978, the leaders of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea held a meeting to prepare a brief statement 
saying that Kampuchea would carry on the struggle to conquer its 
independence. 

c. The position of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
on the problem of negotiations and cease-fire. 

As it has been metnioned above, the Communist Party of Kam- 



The Paris Negotiations 
puchea did not know with whom to negotiate, for Lon Nol was al- 
ready dying. As for the U.S., they were the aggressors. They had to 
stop their aggression. During the talks in October 1972, Secretary 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, 
Pol Pot, said to the Vietnamese: "If the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea ceased fire, even only just for one day, Lon Nol's clique 
would have time to recover its breath. If the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea carried on the fighting, the U.S. and Lon Nol's clique 
would be able to carry only 20 to 30 per cent of their needs in arm- 
aments and food. But if the Communist Party of Kampuchea ac- 
cepted the cease-fire, the enemy would be able to carry each 
month hundreds of thousands of tons to supply their army. Besides, 
a cease-fire would spread confusion in the determination of the 
people and the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea in waging their 
struggle". 

On the other hand, at the end of 1972, the political situation of 
the whole Southeast Asia showed that it was in Kampuchea where 
the revolutionary situation was the best. South Vietnam, on the 
whole, was under the Thieu clique's control. It was the same in 
Laos which, except some regions, was controlled by the adminis- 
tration of Vientiane. As for Kampuchea, Kampuchea's revolution, 
on the whole, grasped the situation well in hand and controlled the 
country. If the map was coloured, black colour would be in every 
place, except in Kampuchea where red colour would dominate. The 
objective of the U.S. imperialists was to take this red place and turn 
it into black colour. If they succeeded in Kampuchea, they would 
surely reinforce their domination over the black places. Kampuchea 
played then a key role. If Kampuchea's revolution accepted the 
cease-fire, it would collapse. As a matter of fact, the U.S. imperialists 
and Lon Nol's clique could then extend the areas under their con- 
Irol, get more people, develop their economy and continue to fur- 
ther extend themselves, until the collapse of the revolution. If Kam- 
puchea's revolution failed, Vietnam's revolution would also fail. It 
would be the same for the other revolutions in South East Asian 
countries. But if Kampuchea's revolution carried on its struggle and 
its move forward, whatever the situation, it would be able to play 
its part in developing the revolutionary situation in Southeast Asia. 

That was why Kampuchea refused to negotiate and cease-fire in 
spite of the Vietnamese pressures, threats and provacations, in spite 
of their attempts at murdering Kampuchea's leaders and their coup 
d'etat plots. Kampuchea's refusal greatly frightened the Vietnamese. 
In October 1972, Le Due Tho was very anxious, for the U.S. inten- 
sified their pressures on the Vietnamese. Why did the U.S. exert 
such pressures? The Communist Party of Kampuchea was not aware 
at all of the development of the negotiations between the U.S. and 
the Vietnamese. The Communist Party of Kampuchea had adopted 



70 



71 



The Paris Negotiations 

such a position of struggle with neither compromise nor cease-fire 
only to defend the interests of Kampuchea's revolution. It did not 
want to interfere in Vietnam's affairs. But in the negotiations with 
the U.S., it was the Vietnamese themselves who became entangled 
among their own manoeuvres. The Vietnamese had told the U.S. 
not to be worried about Kampuchea, for it was them, the Vietna- 
mese who controlled Kampuchea. Let the U.S. accept the Vietna- 
mese proposals and Vietnam would be in charge of .solving the prob- 
lem with Kampuchea. That was what the Vietnamese had told the 
U.S. and they had spread over the world that Kampuchea's revolu- 
tion could fight only thanks to the armaments carried by them. The 
U.S. believed them, for although they have been aware that the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea had contradictions with Vietnam, 
they were not aware of the importance of these contradictions. So, 
when the Vietnamese informed the U.S. that they had failed in 
forcing Kampuchea to negotiate and cease-fire, the U.S. was very 
mad and decided to send their B-52's to bomb Hanoi in December 
1972, until the Vietnamese implored them to stop bombing and to 
resume the negotiations. 



72 



6. THE ACTIVITIES OF VIETNAM 

FOR ACHIEVING ITS OBJECTIVE 

AIMING AT ANNEXING AND 

SWALLOWING KAMPUCHEA 

FROM 1975 UP TO NOW 



1 . From April 17, 1975 Up To the First Semester of 1977 

Kampuchea was totally and definitively liberated on April 17, 
1975. South Vietnam was liberated on April 30, 1975. The Vietna- 
mese had to leave Kampuchea and go back home. The Communist 
Party of Kampuchea requested the Vietnamese to withdraw before 
the end of May 1975 and at the latest, at the end of June 1975. But 
in fact, only one part of the Vietnamese withdrew from Kam- 
puchea. Another part remained, including the Vietnamese soldiers 
who were living to everybody's knowledge, and the Vietnamese 
nationals secretly infiltrated into Kampuchea and who were living 
in hiding themselves among the population. They were however 
much less numerous than before. They were scattered in the remote 
regions of Kampuchea, at Snuol (in Kratie province) and in the pro- 
vinces of Mondulkiri and Ratanakiri. 

It was in Ratanakiri privince where they were the most numerous 
remained in Kampuchea's territory. There were more than 1,000 
scattered here and there in many places in groups of 10 to 100, es- 
pecially in the North of Andaung Meas and Voeunsay, near O Ta 
Pork and O Kampha, about 20 kilometres from the border. 

By keeping its forces to stay in Kampuchea's territory, Vietnam 

73 



The Activities of Vietnam From 1975 Up To Now 

wanted to control Kampuchea, the Party and Kampuchea's people, 
and to organize the people in order to create difficulties for Kampu- 1 
chea's revolution. It also wanted to create bases for its future aggres- 
sion. 

In Ratanakiri, Kampuchea's regional forces requested them to 
withdraw. The Vietnamese replied that the territories located in the | 
North of Andaung Meas and Voeunsay were Vietnamese territories. 
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea 
protested by making them know that these territories are the ones 
on which they asked the Communist Party of Kampuchea for per- 
mission to install their sanctuaries. Although they could not deny 
the facts, they obstinately refused to withdraw. The responsible of 
Kampuchea's regional troops patiently did his utmost to make them 1 
understand that they had to withdraw. But the Vietnamese violent- 
ly pushed him away and threatened to kill him. Actually, they firedl 
at Kampuchea's troops. After this incident occured, the Central 1 
Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea sent its regional \ 
forces to drive them out. Kampuchea then recovered her territories 
in Ratanakiri province. 

In Mondulkiri province, the Vietnamese troops also refused to] 
withdraw. They finally withdrew only under the threat of the pro- 
vincial Secretary to drive them out by force. 

At Snuol (Kratie province), the Vietnamese accepted to withdraw, 
for they were aware of the measures taken in Ratanakiri and Mon- 
dulkiri provinces. 

But along the borders, the Vietnamese border troops, by units of 
20 to 30 soldiers, continuously launched attacks against the troops 
of the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea and unceasingly pro- 
voked incidents. Furthermore, Vietnam sent its nationals to settle 
in Kampuchea's territory, along the borders. In some places, the 
Vietnamese houses were built with some columns in the Vietnamese 
territory and some other in Kampuchea's territory. At Peam Chor, 
Prey Veng province, the Vietnamese also came and settled in Kam- 
puchea's territory. At Kaam Samna, Kandal province, the Vietna- 
mese attacked Kampuchea's troops the day after April 17, 1975. It 
took one month to solve the conflict. 

From Kampot province up to Ratanakiri province, along the 
borders, the Vietnamese unceasingly carried out provocations. 
Moreover, they launched their aggressions against Kampuchea's 
islands trying to take possession of Koh Ses, Koh Thmey and Koh 
Takiev islands located in front of Ream, on which they sent com- 
mandos to land during the night. At the end of May 1975, they at- 
tacked and took possession of Koh Way islands. Thus, the Vietna- 
mese attacked Kampuchea immediately the day after her liberation, j 

In spite of this situation, the Central Committee of the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea decided to go and negotiate once again 

74 



The Activities of Vietnam From 1975 Up To Now 

with Vietnam. At that time, the Central Committee of the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea still regarded Vietnam as a friendly 
country with which Kampuchea had differences, for it was not yet 
aware of Vietnam's secret plan aiming at eliminating the leaders of 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The Central Commitee of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea thought then that Kampuchea and 
Vietnam being liberated, the differences then could be solved. In 
June 1975, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea sent a top ranking delegation to Hanoi. There were 
Comrade Secretary Pol Pot, Comrade Deputy Secretary Nuon Chea 
and Comrade Ieng Sary, member of the Standing Committee of the 
Central Committee as well as other members of the Central Com- 
mittee. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kam- 
puchea knew that there were complicated problems to solve, but 
did not think that the Vietnamese would dare to try to kill the 
leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. That was why al- 
though it had taken into account the security problem for its lead- 
ers, it had nevertheless decided that Comrade Secretary Pol Pot 
would lead the delegation. 

During the negotiations with Vietnam, the delegation of the 
Communist Party of Kampuchea porposed to sign between the two 
parties and two States, Kampuchea- Vietnam, a friendship and non- 
aggression treaty based on mutual respect for independence, sover- 
eignty and territorial integrity, of non-interference in each other's 
internal affairs and reciprocal benefit. Such a treaty could lead to 
solve other problems. But the Vietnamese side did not respond to 
the proposal of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. 

The delegation of the Communist Party of Kampuchea also raised 
the borders' problem on the basis of the solemn statements made 
by the Central Committee of the National Front for Liberation of 
South Vietnam and by the Government of the Democratic Repub- 
lic of North Vietnam in 1967, which recognized Kampuchea's 
present borders and bind themselves to respect them. But the Viet- 
namese side did not talk anything about this borders problem. 

The negotiations did not lead to any result. They only contribut- 
ed to ease the atmosphere of the bilateral relations. 

Concerning Koh Way islands, if Kampuchea had not fought, not 
only would she not have taken them back but furthermore Vietnam 
would have taken possession of other islands, for it knew that, im- 
mediately after liberation, Kampuchea had a lot of weak points 
concerning territorial sea defence. 

Why did the Vietnamese launch attacks and create incidents along 
the borders, and why did they take possession of Kampuchea's 
islands? 

The Vietnamese agents who had infiltrated into the ranks of 
Kampuchea's revolution and were arrested in 1976 pointed out that 

75 



The Activities of Vietnam From 1975 Up To Now 

the Vietnamese exerted pressures along the borders in order to: 

1 . prevent the Communist Party of Kampuchea from consolidat- 
ing the revolutionary power, 

2. prevent Kampuchea from defending herself and in order to 
create favourable conditions allowing them to progressively take 
possession of other parts of Kampuchea's territory, 

3 . encourage their agents infiltrated into the ranks of Kampuchea's 
revolution. 

Therefore immediately after the liberation of Phnom Penh, Viet- 
nam attacked Kampuchea. The situation was still more complex 
than that during the national liberation war under the bombings of 
the U.S. imperialists' B52's. The Vietnamese acted with the object 
of allowing their agents to take over the revolutionary power in 
Kampuchea. And, according to their plan, after their agents had 
succeeded in taking over the power, they would have sent as many 
troops as they wanted into Kampuchea. Thus, in 1975, the Vietna- 
mese objective was not yet to take possession of Kampuchea from 
outside. 

In July 1975, at the ceremony of the founding of the Revolu- 
tionary Army of Kampuchea throughout the country, that is the 
ceremony when each zone handed over their armed forces to the 
Central Committee, the enemy plotted to assassinate the leaders of 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They succeeded in infiltrating 
a fighter belonging to a unit of the North zone, into the group of 
fighters armed with guns and in charge of security in the hall where 
the ceremony was taking place, so that he could fire at the leaders 
of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. According to the enemy's 
plan, this fighter had to carry out his heinous crime at nine o'clock. 
But the plot failed, for all the guns had been emptied of their car- 
tridges before entering the ceremony hall. This enemy plot has been 
unmasked only one year after, in 1976. 

In September 1975, the enemy plotted once again to assassinate 
the leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. They organized 
3 to 4 fighters of a unit of the East zone of Kampuchea to carry out 
the plot, but these fighters did not know the leaders and consequent- 
ly did not know whom to fire at. Their chiefs knew the leaders of \ 
the Communist Party of Kampuchea, but they dared not to carry 
out this heinous crime by themselves, for fear of being arrested. 

In 1976, the enemy were ready to renew once again their murder- 
ing attempt but they failed to do so. In April 1976, the revolutionary 
power dismantled progressively the enemy's networks. This dis- 
mantlement revealed that the Vietnamese planned to launch attacks 
from outside in order to encourage their agents inside Kampuchea. 
Notably, they had to attack the East zone of Kampuchea in liaison 
with a man of the name Cha Krey, a chief of the units quartered in 
the South of Prey Veng province. Cha Krey and his followers were 

76 



The Activities of Vietnam From 1975 Up To Now 

in charge of assassinating the leaders of the Communist Party of 
Kampuchea. The Vietnamese had the Soviets on their side. They 
had to provide their agents ith weapons, material, medicine, etc. 
The Vietnamese thought that they would succeed in having the 
leaders of Kampuchea's revolution assassinated and thus to sow 
confusion of which they would have taken advantage to launch at- 
tacks from the outside. 

2. From Mid-1977 to Mid-1978 

Therefore, the Vietnamese had failed in their successive criminal 
activities: they failed in their attempts at poisoning, at murdering 
by firing and at attacking from outside. That is why in mid-1977, 
they set up a plan of large-scale attack. They had carried out im- 
portant military preparations and they had also carried out many 
activities in the international arena aiming at preparing the world 
public opinion. 

In December 1977, the Vietnamese launched large-scale attacks 
of invasion and aggression against Democratic Kampuchea. For this 
purpose, they used 14 divisions including 5 crack divisions. They 
thought that if they succeeded in taking possession of Kampuchea 
at one go, the world public opinion would not fight back, for they 
would have already set up a new State power and one would think 
then that it was an internal affair of Kampuchea. Here, the Vietna- 
mese have made a subjective evaluation. Indeed they thought that 
as Cuba had succeeded in Africa, they would surely succeed in 
Kampuchea, for they are stronger than Cuba. 

They sent 3 to 4 divisions to attack the Southwestern part of 
Kampuchea and 8 to 9 divisions to attack the Eastern part of Kam- 
puchea. They used the remaining forces for attacking other places, 
like Snuol where they sent one division. 

In the Southwest, the Vietnamese knew that the Revolutionary 
Army of Kampuchea were powerful. So, they launched attacks 
against this region only in order to neutralize the troops of the 
Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, without however giving up 
their objective of taking possession as much as possible of Kam- 
puchea's territory. 

It was in the Eastern part of Kampuchea that the Vietnamese 
concentrated their main attacks. They launched their spearhead of 
attack along national road No. 22, attacking the district of Krek 
and going up along national road No. 7 towards Tonle Bet on the 
Eastern bank of the Mekong river. They reached Khnar, East of the 
district of Suong. They could quickly advance thanks to their agents 
inside of Kampuchea. In Khnar, their column was divided into, one 
headed Northwards and the other, Southwards. Their plan was to 
take Tonle Bet and then, the Northern part of the East zone of 

77 



The Activities of Vietnam From 1975 Up To Now 

Kampuchea. 

Another spearhead of attack was launched along national road 
No. 1 towards the district of Prasaut, Svay Rieng provincial capital 
and Neak Luong district. If they succeeded in occupying Neak 
Luong they would take possession of the Southern part of the East 
zone of Kampuchea. 

After having taken possession of the whole East zone, the Vietna- 
mese would immediately attack Phnom Penh. Phnom Penh has no 
economic importance, but it is the political capital. And a Vietna- 
mese attack against Phnom Penh would force the Revolutionary 
Army of Kampuchea to move one part of their forces towards the 
capital. The Vietnamese would then intensify their attacks against 
the Southwestern part of Kampuchea. Besides, after having taken 
possession of Tonle Bet, the Vietnamese troops would go across the 
Mekong river, in front of the provincial capital of Kampong cham 
on the western bank of the Mekong river and another Vietnamese 
column would head from Snuol towards the Northeast zone of 
Kampuchea. 

The Vietnamese responsibles for this plan were Le Due Tho, Pham 
Hung, Van Tien Dung and Vo Chi Cong. 

With their 14 divisions, the Vietnamese thought they could 
quickly win victory and immediately after set up in Kampuchea a 
State power, puppet of Vietnam. They wanted to achieve their stra- 
tegy "lightning attack, lightning victory". Their attacks were very 
powerful. The Soviets participated in these attacks. The Vietna- 
mese had assured them that victory was certain, for they had used 
their crack divisions, such as division No. 330, a North Vietnamese 
crack division, division No. 320 placed under the direct command 
of Van Tien Dung, and division No. 9, a South Vietnamese crack 
division. The Soviets were certain of the victory and participated in 
the attack as commanders of the units and members of tank crews. 

At that moment, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea were 
not ready for fighting. They had indeed taken measures to defend 
the borders, but they did not think that the Vietnamese would 
launch such large-scale attacks. It was only when the Vietnamese 
reached to Khnar, East of Suong, and from there, launched attacks 
in several directions that Kampuchea's armed forces under the 
direct command of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea arrived and stopped the Vietnamese at Suong. 
They launched attacks on the flanks and at the read of the Vietna- 
mese columns. After three days, they crushed them and inflicted 
heavy casualties on them. 

But it was in the Southwest zone that the Vietnamese casualties 
had been the most important. In this region in Takeo province, the 
Vietnamese troops quietly reached the districts of Prak Sandek and 
Kirivong, in Phnom Den village at about 20 kilometres from the 

78 



The Activities of Vietnam From 1975 Up To Now 

border. But before they could install their positions, the Revolu- 
tionary Army of Kampuchea powerfully counter-attacked them and 
after a few days, they put them into pieces, inflicting on them very 
heavy losses in men and materials. 

3. The Coup D'Etat Attempt Staged by Vietnam in May 1978 

At the end of May 1978, the Government of Democratic Kam- 
puchea under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, 
successfully annihilated once again the plan of the coup d'etat 
fomented by the Vietnamese Party and the Government of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam aiming at overthrowing Democratic 
Kampuchea. 

This time, the plan of coup d'etat had been prepared by the 
Political Bureau of the Vietnamese party and the Government of 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam themselves, after their heavy de- 
feats they had suffered during their military attacks of invasion and 
aggression perpetrated against Democratic Kampuchea in Novem- 
ber and December 1977 and their successive attacks of invasion and 
aggression perpetrated during the first semester of 1978. 

This last attempt at coup d'etat fomented by Vietnam aimed at 
overthrowing Democratic Kampuchea. But in case it did not succeed 
in overthrowing Democratic Kampuchea, Vietnam would strive to 
take possession of the East zone, to separate this zone from the rest 
of Kampuchea, to declare there a separate State power and a party, 
puppets of Vietnam. They would then use the East zone as a spring- 
board to launch military attack and take possession of all the terri- 
tories situated in the East of the Mekong river and of the other 
parts of Kampuchea, until they would take possession of the whole 
Kampuchea. 

Among the Vietnamese who directly received the order from the 
Political Bureau of the Vietnamese party to penetrate into Kam- 
puchea, to establish contacts there and to lead personally the coup 
d'etat and who came and personally carried out activities of sub- 
version against Kampuchea, were the following: 

1. Hay So, member of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam, 

2. Pham Trung Hieu called Ba Hai, assistant of the Central Com- 
mittee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, former counsellor 
at the Embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in Phnom 
Penh, 

3. Nguyen Gia Dang called Tu Cam, assistant of the Central Com- 
mittee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, 

4. Ba Ha, assistant of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam, 

5. Bai Mab, assistant of the Central Committee of the Commun- 
ist Party of Vietnam, 

79 



80 




The Activities of Vietnam From 1975 Up To Now 

6. Mai Viet, assistant of the Central Committee of the Communis 
Party of Vietnam. 

The above-mentioned six Vietnamese with a number of other! 
Vietnamese, secretly penetrated several times into the territory o^ 
Kampuchea to establish contacts and hold meetings in the East 
zone with the agents infiltrated and organized for a long time by 
Vietnam, in order to carry out the plan of coup d'etat and personal 
ly lead this coup d'etat. 

The main secret meetings for preparing this coup d'etat were held 
in the Eastern part of Kampong Cham province, in the area of the 
National Road No. 7, and in Svay Rieng province, in the East zone 
These secret meetings were frequently held, especially in February 
March, April and in the beginning of May 1978 in order to carry 
out the plan of coup d'etat and to launch successive attacks of in] 
vasion against Kampuchea in February, March, April, May and 
June. 

Like the previous times, the Vietnamese set up their plan of cou_ 
d'etat and attacks of invasion against Kampuchea with their sup] 
porters and in collaboration with the C.I.A. But this Vietnamese 
plan of coup d'etat and attacks of invasion against Kampuche 
once again suffered the most ignominious and heaviest defeat. 

This last plan of coup d'etat has more clearly shown the genuin 
nature of aggressor and annexationist of Vietnam which has always 
interfered in other's internal affairs and unceasingly carried out sub 
versive activities and whose hands are stained with the blood of 
Kampuchea's people. It has more clearly shown the strategical objec 
tive of Vietnam attempt at taking possession of Kampuchea in order 
to force her to Vietnam and to integrate her at once into Vietnam 

In words, Vietnam continues to utter lies and claims that it wants 
"to negotiate with Kampuchea to peacefully solve the problem" 
that "Vietnam has no aim at forcing Kampuchea to join the Indo 
china Federation", that "Vietnam respects the independence an 
sovereignty of Democratic Kampuchea", etc. But in deeds, Vietna 
is ferishly carrying on its acts of subversion, interference, violation 
and aggression against Democratic Kampuchea. It is attempting tol 
find any means in order to annex Democratic Kampuchea and t(I 
foment coups d'etat for overthrowing Democratic Kampuchea and 
forcing her to join the "Indochina Federation", a puppet of Vietf 
nam, and then, to swallow Kampuchea in a definite period of time 

4. The Defeats of the Vietnamese Strategy 
"Lightning Attack, Lightning Victory" 

The Vietnamese have carried out the strategy of "lightning at 
tack, lightning victory" in order not to have so many casualties ii 
their armed forces and not to lose too much influence on the inter- 



82 



r- 



The Activities of Vietnam From 1975 Up To Now 

national arena. But this strategy failed and the Vietnamese are now 
driven into a protracted war, that is the strategy of the Revolu- 
honary Army of Kampuchea. This last strategy is to wage a pro- 
I meted struggle, to progressively develop and strengthen oneself in 
I he military, political and economic fields, and to wear out the 
enemy forces little by little until their destruction. Driven into a 
.Irategy of protracted war, the Vietnamese have to face a lot of 
military, political and economic difficulties. In the diplomatical 
field, in December 1977, the world public opinion did not yet un- 
derstand the Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea. But now, it 
understands. So, the Vietnamese strategy of "lightning attack, light- 
ning victory" has failed both in Kampuchea and on the international 
arena. Indeed, the true nature of Vietnam agressor, annexationist 
and swallower of territories has been unmasked in front of the whole 
world. 

Vietnam has been heavily defeated in the military and political 
fields as well as at home. If Vietnam had succeeded in its aggression 
against Kampuchea, everybody would have been satisfied at home, 
for in Loc Ninh and Tay Ninh for example, tens of thousands of 
Vietnamese people were getting ready to come and install them- 
selves in Kampuchea. But now that its aggression has failed, Viet- 
nam has become entangled in many difficulties and is in confusion 
at home. 

But in spite of its defeats, Vietnam has still continued to aggress 
Kampuchea. After the whole world became aware of its aggression 
against Kampuchea through the statement of the Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea on December 31, 1977 and since its aggres- 
sion has failed, Vietnam has changed its strategy. But it has entered 
into a new stage where it has no more possibility to launch attacks 
as powerfully as before. After having used 14 divisions at the end of 
1 1 )77, which had been crushed in January 6, 1978, and lost 29,000 
men, the Vietnamese army had used the following forces 1 to carry 
on their aggression against Kampuchea: 

February 1978: 2 divisions 

March 1978: 3 divisions 

April 1978: 4 divisions 

May 1978: 4 to 5 divisions 

June 1978: 4 divisions 

July 1978: 3 divisions 

August 1978: 2 and a half divisions. 

In the forthcoming dry season, from November 1978 up, Vietnam 
would be able to use up to 6 or 7 divisions. It will not dare to send 

I . These are real forces and not nominal divisions. Indeed, owing to the diffi- 
ii i lies in recruitment, the Vietnamese divisions do not reach their full effec- 
tiveness and often exist only in name. 

83 



The Activities of Vietnam From 1975 Up To Now 

many troops from North Vietnam in order not to withdraw its gar- 
rison from the Northern border with China. At the border of Svay 
Rieng province, in August 1978, it could send only one regiment in 
support. And the regiment had only 600 men whereas before, one 
Vietnamese regiment had from 1,800 to 2,000 men. Being com- 
posed mainly of new recruits from Saigon, these units were quickly 
put into pieces by the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea. 

Since July 1978, the Vietnamese have used planes to bomb Kam- 
puchea's territory along the borders, especially in the East zone and 
in the region of Parrot Beak. The fact that they have resorted to 
their aviation shows the great weakness of their infantry. From July 
to September 1978, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea has 
shot down 9 Vietnamese fighter-bombers and helicopters. The Viet- 
namese aviation cannot play a strategical role: Vietnam is a back- 
ward agricultural country, so the resort to aviation will only create 
more difficulties in the political field as well as in the economic and 
financial fields. 



7. BY WAY OF CONCLUSION 



84 



In their combat against the Vietnamese acts of aggression and an- 
nexation, the people and the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea, 
under the correct and clearsighted leadership of the Communist 
I 'arty of Kampuchea and its Secretary Pol Pot, have overcome all 
obstacles. They have firmly abided by the position of independence, 
sovereignty, self-reliance and of being masters of the destiny of 
l heir country. They have accepted many sacrifices. That is a noble 
national task they have to fulfill. The people and the Revolutionary 
Army of Kampuchea have accepted these sacrifices for the sacred 
interests of their country, for the independence, sovereignty, terri- 
torial integrity of Democratic Kampuchea and their right to dispose 
of their own destiny by themselves. That is undeniable. But if Kam- 
puchea's people did not hold aloft the banner of independence, 
national honour and dignity, if they did not struggle with deter- 
mination and crush the banner of aggression and annexation, the 
l>anner of "Indochina Federation", and the banner of hegemonisnl, 
what would have been the situation in Southeast Asia and in Asia? 
The expansionist big power and Vietnam .annexationist and swal- 
lower of territories would have been still more arrogant and more 
presumptuous, and they would have carried on their expansion in 
Southeast Asia. Consequently, the interests of many countries in 
Asia, Africa, Europe and America would have suffered. 

Therefore, the victory won by Kampuchea's people against the 

85 



Conclusion 

annexation of Vietnam and the position of Democratic Kampuchej 
as an independent, neutral and non-aligned country with neithe 
foreign troops nor foreign military bases in her territory these ar 
favourable factors for the cause of independence and peace, particu- 
larly in Southeast Asia, and for the interests of Asia and the worlt 
as a whole. Indeed, the struggle of Kampuchea's people concern 
not only Kampuchea, but it is also the struggle against the strateg 
ot the expansionist big power in Asia. That is why people the worl 
over, especially the peoples in Asia and Southeast Asia, have ex 
pressed their sympathy with and their encouragement, and hav* 
given their active and sincere support to the present struggle o 
Kampuchea s people to defend their national independence 
• I ter uf m ? l efeated at Kampuchea's front, Vietnam has to fad 
inextricable difficulties at home as well as on the international 
arena. Being driven into the strategy of a protracted war, the Viet- 
namese forces are wearing down more and more. The Vietnamese 
people have to face greater and greater starvation and rise up mori 
and more strongly against the Vietnamese administration Insecurity 
is developing in South Vietnam and has reached the Northern part 
On the international arena, the people the world over have clearly 
discerned the perfidious and hypocritical face of Vietnam aggressor 
an aligned country and tool of the expansionist big power 

The foreign and United Nations aids have been directly or in 
directly used by Vietnam to maintain and develop its forces ir 
order to carry on its aggression against Kampuchea and extend it< 
expansion m Southeast Asia. More and more countries are now ask 
ing themselves as follows: "Would the cooperation and the moral 
political, diplomatic, economic and financial assistances they hav 
given to Vietnam not indeed help Vietnam to take possession | 
Southeast Asia? Would they not indeed serve the strategy of the ex 
pansiomst big power in Southeast Asia and in Asia?" Vietnam re 
ceives aids from various sources, this does not mean that it is in 
dependent. It is its master, the expansionist big power that has told 
it to receive these aids, for it does not have enough bread for itself 
and has no possibility to give Vietnam enough aids. The countries 
and international organizations which have given aids to Vietnam 
become more cautious and are reconsidering the problem of their 
aids to Vietnam. 

At present Vietnam is diluding various countries, kneeling dowl 
and begging these countries for aids in order to use them to remedy 
its forces and carry on its aggression against Kampuchea 

Before the defeat of its aggression in Kampuchea, Vietnam was 
very arrogant and presumptuous. It praised the power of its army 
launched threats and insults against the Southeast Asian countries,' 

senLter'of Xtt^ ° n ^Z 6 ' 1978 and dmin ^ *e first 
semester ot 1978, the expansionist big power and Vietnam had been 

86 



Conclusion 

forced to change by 100 per cent their stratagem, their tactics and 
their attitude towards the Southeast Asian countries. Previously, for 
I hem, all was bad. Now, all is good. They try to carry out in South- 
east Asia diplomatic manoeuvres and like a "cat hiding its claws" 
lliey are always smiling. Their objective is to exculpate themselves 
from their aggression against Democratic Kampuchea and from their 
insults against the Southeast Asian countries, and also to isolate 
Kampuchea from the other countries in Southeast Asia, at surround- 
ing her from behind so that they will launch new large-scale attacks 
against Kampuchea when the situation is favourable to them. The 
diplomatic manoeuvres of Vietnam and the expansionist big power 
are really too clear. They have failed even before they have been 
carried out thanks to the vigilance of the Southeast Asian peoples 
who have been fully aware of the perfidious nature of Vietnam and 
the expansionist big power. 

The Vietnamese aggression like all other aggressions, never pays! 
Such is th lesson of history. 

Kampuchea's people want only to live in peace in order to be 
able to mobilize all their time and forces to build up the country, 
a new and prosperous society, in national honour, dignity and in- 
dependence. 

Democratic Kampuchea does not put any condition on Vietnam 
for solving the problem. It is rather Vietnam agressor, annexationist 
and swallower of territories which, in Hitler's style, has put condi- 
tions on Democratic Kampuchea. Indeed, when he threatened and 
aggressed the East European countries, Hitler forced these countries 
to negotiate, to capitulate and put their territories under his rule. 
Vietnam acts in the same manner. It has aggressed Kampuchea in 
the savage and fascist way and it says that Kampuchea has to nego- 
tiate with it. Such are the conditions of Vietnam which wants on 
the one hand, to force Kampuchea to capitulate and to be under its 
yoke, and on the other hand to hide its face of aggressor and swal- 
lower of territories, to mislead the world public opinion and legalize 
its acts of aggression and annexation. If the problem created by the 
Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea has not yet been solved, 
it is not because there has been no negotiation or intermediary. 
From 1970 to 1977, before and after liberation, negotiations be- 
tween Kampuchea and Vietnam had been held for nearly 100 
times, at the summit as well as at the level of Central Committee, in 
Kampuchea's revolutionary bases, in Hanoi-or in Phnom Penh. More- 
over many negotations were held along the borders at the level of 
the Committee of zones, regions or districts. But the problem could 
not be solved. For that, we would have to eliminate the root of this 
problem, that is to eliminate the Vietnamese ambition of swallow- 
ing Kampuchea and the Vietnamese strategy of "Indochina Feder- 
ation". 

87 



Conclusion 

If Vietnam immediately stops its aggression against Kampuchea! 
the war would stop automatically. If Vietnam respects the inde- 
pendence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea and 
renounces its strategy of "Indochina Federation" and annexation of 
Kampuchea, through concrete acts, in conformity with the princi- 
ples of non-alignment, the Pancha Sila and the United Nations 
Charter, then friendship between the two countries and two peoples 
Kampuchea and Vietnam, would be born automatically developed 
and strengthened progressively. The Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea has already expressed this position several times to the 
world. 

In June 1975 during the visit of the top delegation of the Com- 
munist Party of Kampuchea to Hanoi, the Kampuchea side official- 
ly proposed to the Vietnamese side to sign a friendship and non-ae- 
gression treaty between the two countries. But the Vietnamese side 
did not take into consideration and did not comply with Kampu- 
chea s good-will. Despite that, todayif Vietnam stops its aggression 
against Kampuchea and accepts to respect the independence sov- 
ereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea, through concrete 
acts, the Government of Democratic Kampuchea would propose 
once again to Vietnam to sign a friendship and non-aggression 
treaty. Democratic Kampuchea's high ranking leaders would sign 
this treaty whether in Phnom Penh or in Hanoi or elsewhere if Viet- 
nam shows that it really wants to have relations of friendship with 
Kampuchea. 

But Vietnam is bent on trying to swallow Kampuchea and ex- 
tend its expansion in Southeast Asia, and the expansionist big 
power is trying to take possession of Southeast Asia in the frame- 
work of its global strategy. In such a situation, they are striving to 
carry on their aggression against Kampuchea, and that despite Viet- 
nam has to face grave difficulties. At present, the Vietnamese army 
unceasingly launch their attacks of aggression against Kampuchea 
At the same time, they are actively mobilizing their forces to ven- 
ture m launching a new large-scale attack of invasion and aggression 
during this forthcoming dry season, that is from next November 
Ine expansionist big power sends by airlift and by seaway thous- 
ands of advisors, huge quantities of armaments aiming at regenerat- 
ing Vietnam. As for several Vietnamese divisions quartered in for- 
eign territory they are also getting ready to attack Kampuchea at 
any favourable occasion. The expansionist big power uses the Viet- 
namese Army as its mercenary army in Asia, as it has already used 
another mercenary army in Africa, in conformity with the sinister 
doctrine of 10 years ago, and which consists of using the Asian 
traitors to fight against the Asian peoples. The smiling diplomacy of 
Vietnam and of the expansionist big power in Southeast Asia as 
well as their lying propaganda would not be able to hide their prep- 

88 






Conclusion 

nations of large-scale aggression against Democratic Kampuchea 
iluring this forthcoming dry season. 

In such a situation, the people and the Revolutionary Army of 
Kampuchea always heighten their revolutionary vigilance. They al- 
ways further develop and strengthen their traditional revolutionary 
heroism, consent to go on accepting sacrifices, enduring all difficul- 
ties and sufferings and overcoming all obstacles by firmly abiding 
by the position of independence, sovereignty and self-reliance. 

Under the correct and clearsighted leadership of the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea and its Secretary Pol Pot, they resolutely carry 
On their struggle, holding aloft the banner of national independence, 
national honour and dignity in order to ever defend and safeguard 
Democratic Kampuchea. By doing so, Kampuchea's people fulfill 
at one and the same time their sacred national duty and their noble 
internationalist duty. The people and the Revolutionary Army of 
Kampuchea grasp the situation well in hand, for they enjoy better 
conditions always, thanks to the victories won in their tasks of na- 
tional defence and construction and also thanks to the sympathy 
and supports of the peoples in Southeast Asia, Asia and in the 
world. Before, Kampuchea's people had started their struggle from 
scratch and they had defeated the imperialists' chieftain that is 
U.S. imperialism and its lackeys. After liberation, in a situation 
when they had to face numerous difficulties and grave problems, 
they have successfully defended Democratic Kampuchea, totally 
safeguarded her independence and territorial integrity. In the 
future, they will defend her still more successfully. 



89 




G.K. RAM 
P.O. BOX 5857 / GRAND CENTRAL STATION / NEW YORK NY 10017 

Price $2.95